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I. Introduction
Much attention has been paid by legal scholars to the permissibility and
scope of remedial measures afforded by federal courts-acting pursuant to the
well-established doctrine of Ex parte Young'-in response to suits alleging
violations of federal law by State officials.2 Much attention has also been paid
by legal scholars, especially in the last few years, to the permissibility and
scope of remedial measures afforded by Congress-acting pursuant to Section
5 of the Fourteenth Amendment 3-in response to actual or potential violations
4of federal law (namely, due process and equal protection) by States. But very
little academic literature has attempted to analyze or compare critically these
two vehicles for remedying federal-law violations by States, and specifically the
Supreme Court's response to these distinct but related vehicles, together under
the same rubric.5 And none of the existing literature attempts to draw upon the
1. Exparte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). See infra Part II (examining scope of federal
courts' power under Young doctrine). Indeed, the Young doctrine provides federal courts the
necessary discretion to go beyond the express requirements of federal law to ensure that the
violation is properly remedied, as, for example, in the school desegregation and prison reform
cases. See infra Part II.A.2 (examining modem development of Young doctrine).
2. See infra note 21 (citing sources on development of Young doctrine).
3. See infra Part III (examining scope of Congress's power under Section 5 of
Fourteenth Amendment). A familiar example of Congress's efforts under Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment is the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971-1973bb-1.
4. See infra note 357 (collecting sources).
5. Professor Thomas has thoughtfully raised the connection between judge-ordered
remedial decrees in equity and Congress's Section 5 enforcement authority. See Tracy A.
Thomas, The Prophylactic Remedy: Normative Principles and Definitional Parameters of
Broad Injunctive Relief, 52 BuFF. L. REv. 301, 335-39, 349-52 (2004) [hereinafter Thomas,
Prophylactic Remedy] ("[T]he Court has used the analogue ofjudicial remedial power to define
the parameters of the legislature's designated remedial power."); Tracy A. Thomas, Congress'
Section 5 Power andRemedial Rights, 34 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 673,724-39 (2001) [hereinafter
Thomas, RemedialRights] (comparing Supreme Court's requirements of"causal nexus between
remedy and violation" in judicial prophylactic remedies and Section 5 remedies). However,
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special insights offered by consent decrees, the focus of this Article, as an
example of remedial judicial authority at its broadest and most comparable to a
legislative remedy.
My thesis is that doing so will expose the unsupportable nature of the
Supreme Court's jurisprudence in this area-a jurisprudence that grants
considerable discretion to federal district court judges to order prophylactic
relief for federal-law violations by States while narrowly limiting congressional
power to prevent or remedy such conduct. The inconsistency is most stark
when one considers the consent decree context, in which Supreme Court
doctrine effectively permits district courts unchecked authority to enter and
enforce prophylactic remedies against States, provided the parties initially
agree. This inconsistent treatment is problematic not only from a federalism
perspective because it renders unclear the correct balance of State-federal
power, but also from a separation-of-powers perspective because it ignores the
relative capacity of federal courts and Congress to provide such relief. The
inconsistent treatment also cannot be squared with the Rehnquist Court's
apparent fixation with States' rights. Instead, it perhaps reveals the Rehnquist
Court's deeper twin concerns of enhancing judicial supremacy and limiting
congressional power, even at the expense of State sovereignty and doctrinal
coherence.
The tension is best resolved, I argue, not by reducing federal court
authority under Ex parte Young but rather by recognizing the constitutionally
mandated, institutionally justified, and democratically sanctioned role of
Congress in fashioning remedial legislation under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment and thus according it the discretion understandably wielded by
district court judges in resolving the complex and serious problems created by a
State's defiance of federal law.
Professor Thomas compares the two contexts at a level of generality that, while sufficient for her
purposes of indicating a common prophylactic role, fails to reveal the tension between the
differing levels of deference accorded by the Supreme Court. Similarly, Professors Hamilton
and Schoenbrod refer to the law of remedies and judicial equity in reviewing the recent Section
5 jurisprudence. Marci A. Hamilton & David Schoenbrod, The Reaffirmation of
Proportionality Analysis Under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, 21 CARDOZo L. REV.
469, 479-87 (1999). All three scholars arrive at a similar conclusion that the Section 5 power is
merely subject to (Thomas) or should be subject to (Hamilton/Schoenbrod) the same (or greater)
limits placed on judicial prophylactic relief. Id. at 486; Thomas, Prophylactic Remedy, at 337,
352; Thomas, Remedial Rights, at 728. I, however, argue that the Supreme Court has in fact
placed greater constraints on the Section 5 power than on comparable judicial relief, and that
Congress is owed the broader deference given district judges in entering consent decrees against
States. None of the previous work considers the special insights offered by the consent decree
context or the overlay of Ex parte Young, as examined here through the Supreme Court's
decision in Frew ex rel. Frew v. Hawkins, 540 U.S. 431 (2004), infra Part II.C.
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The Article proceeds as follows: Part II discusses the origins of and recent
developments in Ex parte Young doctrine, starting with traditional injunctive
orders that follow judgments against State6 officials and then focusing on the
special category of consent decrees against State actors. The Young doctrine,
originally conceived as a narrow exception to State sovereign immunity from
suit in federal court, has gradually expanded over time to confer relatively
broad remedial authority on federal district judges. Part II.A shows the clear
trend over the last seventy years of federal courts routinely exercising broad
remedial powers in suits alleging federal-law violations by State actors,
notwithstanding a few recent Supreme Court cases cutting back on the
applicability of Young and the scope of equitable relief more generally. As
demonstrated in Part II.B, nowhere is this clearer than in the context of consent
decrees ratified and issued by district courts in institutional reform litigation
against State entities. Part II.C focuses on one such example in depth: the
2004 Supreme Court decision in Frew ex rel. Frew v. Hawkins.7 At issue in
Frew was the enforceability of an extensive, eighty-page consent decree issued
by a federal district court in a suit alleging that the State of Texas failed to
comply with certain obligations under the federal Medicaid law. Part II.C
reviews the reasoning in Frew and discusses the Supreme Court's unanimous
and sweeping conclusion regarding the permissibility of the consent decree's
relief under an implicitly expansive interpretation of Exparte Young doctrine.
Part IH shifts gears to discuss the scope of Congress's enforcement power
under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Part II.A discusses Section 5's
historical and textual mandate empowering Congress to enforce the provisions
of the Fourteenth Amendment, including due process and equal protection
rights, against the States. Part III.B shows its broad construction by the
Supreme Court during the civil-rights era. Part HI.C demonstrates how, despite
the aforementioned history and precedent, the Rehnquist Court has adopted a
relatively narrow view of the congressional power to enact Section 5
legislation. The focus of Part III.C is on the recent line of cases striking down
portions of federal civil rights statutes that provided for enforcement against
State entities. This section reviews how the Court construes such legislation as
beyond Congress's Section 5 power and, more precisely, how the Court
narrows congressional power by restrictively applying its confused and
confusing "congruence and proportionality" doctrine.
6. When I use the capitalized term "State" in this article, I mean to refer to only state-
level governmental officials and entities as opposed to other subsidiary, local governmental
(city, county, etc.) entities. The distinction is important to the extent Eleventh Amendment
concerns shape one's view of the extent of permissible relief.
7. Frew ex rel. Frew v. Hawkins, 540 U.S. 431 (2004).
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Part IV juxtaposes the Court's disparate treatment of the enforcement
mechanisms at issue. Based on the discussions in Parts II and III, the
difference in deference paid to federal district courts in ordering Ex parte
Young relief and that paid to Congress in fashioning Section 5 legislation
becomes readily apparent. The section pays special attention to the less
restrictive tailoring analysis applied by the Supreme Court when analyzing a
lower-court decree as opposed to congressional legislation. The contrast is
clearest between Young-based consent decrees and Section 5 legislation.
But establishing this disparate treatment is not enough: One might argue
that the different contexts, despite implicating similar federalism concerns,
are sufficiently distinguishable to warrant such disparate treatment. After all,
in the typical Young case, a court has adjudicated an actual federal-law
violation before awarding relief against the State official, and that injunctive
relief is usually narrowly designed to apply only to the parties named in the
lawsuit. This is not the case with respect to Section 5 legislation. The
consent decree example, however, collapses these apparent distinctions,
making the contexts surprisingly comparable in most relevant aspects. In
Frew itself, for example, the district court entered a consent decree imposing
class-wide, statewide, affirmative obligations well beyond the explicit scope
of the Medicaid statute (much like Congress in enacting prophylactic Section
5 legislation) before making any findings regarding alleged violations of the
Medicaid statute.
Although consent decrees do have the obvious distinguishing trait of
initial agreement to the terms by State officials, upon closer scrutiny, that
distinction does not meaningfully mitigate federalism concerns. As a
doctrinal matter, the Supreme Court in Frew assumed without deciding that
the State's initial consent did not constitute a waiver of its sovereign
immunity. 8 Moreover, there is a distinction between consent by "the State" to
decree terms and consent by individual State officials. The named State
officials who agree to a decree may have different incentives than other State
officials and, as a result, their consent may not reflect the will of the State
legislature or State governor. Furthermore, even assuming a collective will, a
State's initial consent is very different from a State's voluntary compliance:
After all, the consent is obtained under the duress of costly litigation; the
State cannot ordinarily back away from any of the terms for the duration of
the decree; and, in certain circumstances, the court can modify the decree
terms despite the State's objection.
8. Id. at 436-37 ("[W]e do not address the waiver argument.").
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Importantly, the irrationality of the differing treatment does not
necessarily tell us which approach-the "strict scrutiny" approach in present
Section 5 cases, the "middle road" approach in traditional Ex parte Young
cases, or the most deferential approach in Young-based consent decree cases
such as Frew-is preferable. I therefore discuss textual, institutional, and
other reasons why the Court should apply the greater deference afforded
district courts in Young-based consent decree cases when reviewing the
validity of Section 5 legislation. It is imprudent for the Court to apply more
exacting scrutiny to Congress-a more democratic and better equipped (both
in terms of identifying violations and fashioning complex remedial schemes)
institution operating with a historical and textual mandate-than to district
court judges.
Part V suggests that the Court's consent decree jurisprudence not only
highlights the problem with its approach to Section 5, but also suggests a
solution. In Frew, the Court's inquiry essentially turned on whether the
consent decree was "related to" and "furthered objectives of' federal law. I
argue that applying this standard to Section 5 legislation-specifically,
whether Congress's enforcement effort is "related to" and "furthers the
objectives of' Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment-would afford
Congress appropriate discretion and provide the Court a mode of review with
which it is already familiar.
The Article concludes by discussing the possible motivations behind the
existing inconsistency by reference to larger themes drawn from the
Rehnquist Court's jurisprudence: judicial supremacy and the limitation of
congressional power.
II. The Expanding Scope of Ex Parte Young Relief and Consent Decrees
This section seeks to provide a descriptive account of the evolving (and,
for the most part, broadening) scope of the Young doctrine. It discusses two
separate but related species of relief resulting from Young-based litigation:
Part II.A focuses on injunctive relief ordered by a district court after a
judgment of liability against State officials; Part II.B focuses on consent
decrees in which the parties agree to certain relief in the form of a judicial
order. The latter form of relief, notably broader, is examined more closely in
Part II.C through the Supreme Court's 2004 decision in Frew ex rel. Frew v.
Hawkins.
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A. The Evolving Scope of the Young Doctrine
1. Basic Theory and Origins
State sovereign immunity, grounded in federalism notions of state
autonomy and linked to the Eleventh Amendment, limits the reach of federal
judicial power against the States. In other words, as currently construed, the
Eleventh Amendment generally prohibits, subject to some important
exceptions, suits brought by individuals in federal court against State
governments, including those suits based on a State's violation of federal law.9
Nevertheless, federal courts are not powerless to protect individuals when
States flout federal law. The principle of State sovereign immunity can be
circumvented, at least in part, by a suit naming a State officer as defendant
instead of the State.' 0 This practice has its roots in English common law, under
which the King's officers-but not the King himself-could be sued to remedy
governmental wrongs." On a more practical level, the doctrinal move
9. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54-56 (1996). The proper construction of the
bounds of State sovereign immunity and the Eleventh Amendment has been the subject of
heated debate almost since the beginning of American constitutional law. See ERWIN
CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 393-409 (4th ed. 2003) (summarizing the historical
development of Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence). Many distinguished jurists and scholars
have argued in favor of the "diversity theory" of the Eleventh Amendment: The amendment
bars suit in federal court only when the suit is based on diversity (as opposed to federal question
or admiralty) jurisdiction. See, e.g., Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 301
(1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing for diversity theory); William A. Fletcher, The
Diversity Explanation of the Eleventh Amendment: A Reply to Critics, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1261
passim (1989) (explaining and advocating diversity theory). However, it is clear that the
Rehnquist Court has rejected that position in favor of a more robust view of State sovereign
immunity. See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 727-28 (1999) (determining scope of State
sovereign immunity by looking beyond letter of Eleventh Amendment to "history and
experience"); Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 54-55 (noting that Congress may abrogate State
sovereign immunity through valid exercise of its power).
10. The Court approved of such officer suits as early as 1824. See Reagan v. Farmers'
Loan & Trust Co., 154 U.S. 362, 389 (1894) (allowing suit against state attorney general and
members of state railroad commission); Osborn v. President of the Bank of the United States, 22
U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 857-58 (1824) (allowing suit against state auditor and treasurer and their
successors and agents). But see In re Ayers, 123 U.S. 443,496-97 (1887) (limiting officer suit
because State official's act did not give rise to cause of action cognizable at common law). The
emergence of the Young doctrine, from a historical perspective, has been tied to Lochner-era
concerns; that is, courts needed a way to circumvent Eleventh Amendment immunity in order to
review the constitutionality of state economic regulations as a matter of substantive due process.
Patricia L. Barsalou & Scott A. Stengel, Ex Parte Young: Relativity in Practice, 72 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 455, 471-82 (1998).
11. JOHN V. ORTH, THE JUDICIAL POWER OF THE UNITED STATEs: THE ELEVENTH
AMENDMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 41 (1987); Louis L. Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and
Officers: Sovereign Immunity, 77 HARV. L. REV. 1, 1-2 (1963).
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represents an accommodation between State sovereign immunity and the need
to ensure the supremacy of federal law. 12 It is that accommodation-embraced,
embellished, and brought to the forefront in Ex parte Young-that forms the
basis of what is today referred to as the Young doctine.
Although the doctrine has evolved over time, the facts and reasoning of
Young itself are instructive as to its theoretical underpinnings. The State of
Minnesota adopted a law limiting railroad rates.1 3 A group of railroad company
shareholders, alleging the law to be unconstitutional, instituted an action in
federal court against State attorney general Edward Young to enjoin
enforcement of the law.' 4 The court issued a preliminary injunction against
Young.' 5 After a series of unsuccessful proceedings below, 16 Young argued to
the Supreme Court that the Eleventh Amendment required dismissal of the
nonconsented suit. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that the Eleventh
Amendment does not bar suits against State officers to enjoin constitutional
violations because State officers have no authority to violate the federal
Constitution. 7  Therefore, the Court concluded, their illegal acts were
essentially ultra vires and stripped of the State authority protected by Eleventh
Amendment immunity. 18
12. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 9, at 420-22 (defending Young's legal fiction as useful
balancing mechanism).
13. Exparte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 127 (1908).
14. Id. at 129.
15. Id. at 132.
16. The procedural posture of the case was actually much more complicated. Following
entry of the preliminary injunction, the State-contrary to the federal court's order-filed a
mandamus action in State court to compel the railroad's compliance with the law at issue. Id. at
133-34. The federal court then entered contempt sanctions and an order to hold Young in
custody pending compliance. Id. at 126, 134. Thereafter, Young filed a petition for writ of
habeas corpus in the Supreme Court. Id. at 126-27. Although not relevant for our purposes,
Young also thereby implicated concerns relating to the proper relationship between State and
federal courts now embodied in the doctrine known as Younger abstention.
17. Id. at 160.
18. The Court explained:
The act to be enforced is alleged to be unconstitutional, and if it be so, the
use of the name of the State to enforce an unconstitutional act to the injury
of complainants is a proceeding without the authority of and one which
does not affect the State in its sovereign or governmental capacity. It is
simply an illegal act upon the part of a state official in attempting to use the
name of the State to enforce a legislative enactment which is void because
unconstitutional. If the act which the state Attorney General seeks to
enforce be a violation of the Federal Constitution, the officer in proceeding
under such enactment comes into conflict with the superior authority of that
Constitution, and he is in that case stripped of his official or representative
character and is subjected in his person to the consequences of his
1008
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2. Modern Development (1970s-1980s)
Notwithstanding the "obvious fiction"19 employed in Young to justify its
circumvention (albeit limited) of State sovereign immunity, the Young doctrine
has not only persisted but has grown to become the primary vehicle for
challenging unconstitutional conduct by States.2 °  Though Young's
development has not been a one-way ticket to obliterating Eleventh
Amendment immunity, a review of the numerous battles over the type, scope,
and availability of relief illustrates the steady expansion of affirmative remedial
measures in Young suits. The history is fairly extensive,2' so only the relevant
highlights are covered here.
Let us start with the traditional limits on Young suits. First, the plaintiffs
must allege an ongoing, as opposed to just past, violation of law.22 Second, that
alleged violation must be of federal, as opposed to state, law.23 Finally, as to
the type of permissible relief in an otherwise valid Young suit, the Court has
drawn a line-albeit fuzzy-between retrospective and prospective relief, a line
(imperfectly) reflecting the Court's concern for protecting State treasuries.24
Accordingly, the Court has held that the Eleventh Amendment prevents a
federal court from awarding relief to compensate for past injuries-
retrospective relief-when such a damages award will be paid from the State
treasury, even if an individual officer is the named defendant.25 But the Court
individual conduct. The State has no power to impart to him any immunity
from responsibility to the supreme authority of the United States.
Id. at 159-60.
19. Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261,270 (1997).
20. Kenneth Culp Davis, Suing the Government by Falsely Pretending To Sue an Officer,
29 U. Cm. L. REv. 435, 437 (1962).
21. For further background on the development of the Young doctrine, see CHEMERINSKY,
supra note 9, at 418-38; Barsalou & Stengel, supra note 10, at 471-86; James Leonard, Ubi
Remedium Ibi Jus, or, Where There's a Remedy, There's a Right: A Skeptic's Critique of Ex
Parte Young, 54 SYRACUSE L. REv. 215, 221-63 (2004).
22. Verizon Md. Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 535 U.S. 635, 645 (2002).
23. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 106 (1984).
24. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 677 (1974).
25. Id.; Ford Motor Co. v. Dep't of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459, 464 (1945). The facts of
Edelman v. Jordan are illustrative. The plaintiffs sued Edelman, the relevant Illinois State
official, on grounds that the State failed to comply with federal standards for processing welfare
applications. Edelman, 415 U.S. at 653. The plaintiffs sought two types of relief: an order
requiring the State official to provide back payments of all funds that were improperly withheld
in the past and an injunction requiring the State official to comply with federal guidelines in the
future. Id. at 656. The Court found that the Eleventh Amendment barred the former because
such relief is the equivalent of monetary damages for the State's past conduct to be paid from
the State treasury. Id. at 667.
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has repeatedly recognized that the Eleventh Amendment does not prohibit a
federal court from providing injunctive relief to ensure future compliance-
prospective relief-against the same defendant, even though implementation of
26the terms of the injunction may cost the State significant money.
The retrospective-prospective line, however, appears to be a fine one. In
applying that line, the Court has relied in certain cases on the language in
Edelman that the Eleventh Amendment does not bar "ancillary" relief against
State treasuries. In Hutto v. Finney,27 plaintiffs successfully challenged the
conditions of their confinement in State prisons as violating the Eighth
Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. 28 The district
court awarded attorneys' fees to the plaintiffs to be paid by the State. 29 The
Supreme Court held that the fee award did not run afoul of the Eleventh
Amendment, reasoning that it was ancillary to the injunctive relief ordered in
favorof the plaintiffs.3 ° As Professor Chemerinsky has noted, Hutto "expanded
the notion of permissible relief because in Edelman the Court spoke 'not of
ancillary orders to pay money but of orders having ancillary effects on the
treasury.'
31
Similarly, in Quern v. Jordan,32 a follow-up to Edelman, the Supreme
Court upheld as permissible ancillary relief the district court's order that the
State send notices informing all class members that they were denied money
owed to them and that administrative procedures were available for collecting
the funds.33 However, just six years later in Green v. Mansour,34 the Court held
that the Eleventh Amendment barred a federal court from compelling the State
to send notices informing welfare recipients that they might wrongfully have
26. See Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332,346-49 (1979) (upholding order requiring State to
notify members of plaintiff class that the State might wrongfully have denied them benefits);
Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267,289-90 (1977) (upholding order requiring State to bear part
of costs of programs to remedy effects of discrimination); Edelman, 415 U.S. at 667-68
(upholding order requiring State to pay retroactive benefits that had been wrongfully withheld).
27. Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978).
28. Id. at 680.
29. Id. at 684-85.
30. Id. at 691-92. The Court also approved additional attorneys' fees awarded by the
appeals court under a civil rights statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1988, based on the ability of Congress to
override the Eleventh Amendment pursuant to statutes adopted under Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment Id. at 693-700. See infra Part III (examining scope of Congress's
Section 5 power).
31. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 9, at 427-28 (quoting David P. Currie, Sovereign Immunity
and Suits Against Government Officers, 1984 SuP. CT. REv. 149, 162 (1984)).
32. Quem v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332 (1979).
33. Id. at 334.
34. Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64 (1985).
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been denied benefits.35 The Court distinguished Quern on grounds that the
notice relief in Green was not ancillary to other prospective relief because the
State had voluntarily conformed to federal law after the suit was brought,
obviating the need for any prospective injunction.36
Despite this ambiguity, the Court has adopted an unmistakably broad
reading of the prospective category outside the narrow notice-relief context.
For example, in Milliken v. Bradley,37 the Court upheld a school desegregation
order requiring the expenditure of State funds for several remedial and
compensatory education programs. The Court characterized the remedy as
prospective for Young purposes and thus permissible:
The decree to share the future costs of educational components in this case
fits squarely within the prospective-compliance exception reaffirmed by
Edelman.... That the programs are also "compensatory" in nature does not
change the fact that they are part of a plan that operates prospectively to
bring about the delayed benefits of a unitary school system. We therefore
hold that such prospective relief is not barred by the Eleventh
Amendment.
38
As several scholars have noted, this remedial order could easily have been
labeled retrospective and consequently barred like the back pay remedy in
Edelman.39 Thus, although the distinction is facially described as retrospective
versus prospective, the Court has permitted federal district courts to order much
injunctive relief requiring State expenditures, even when aimed at remedying
past wrongs.
The key move in Edelman and its progeny-permitting injunctive relief
notwithstanding significant State expenditures-has facilitated the steady
expansion from strictly prohibitory injunctions, such as that in Young itself, to
the type of broad affirmative/structural/prophylactic relief seen in more
contemporary Young suits. Several scholars have noted-some with praise,
others with lament-the phenomenon of broad judicial relief in institutional
reform cases, of which Young suits are an important subset.40 The "systematic
35. Id. at 65-66.
36. Id. at 69-72.
37. Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267 (1977) [hereinafter Milliken 11].
38. Id. at 289-90.
39. See, e.g., CHEMERINSKY, supra note 9, at 427 (explaining Court's distinction between
retroactive and ancillary relief); David P.Currie, Sovereign Immunity and Suits Against
Governmnet Officers, 1984 SuP. CT. REV. 149, 162 (1984) (noting that Court could have
chosen to treat order as retrospective); Gerald E. Frug, The Judicial Power of the Purse, 126 U.
PA. L. REV. 715, 751-53 (1978) (noting that remedy could have been barred as retrospective
relief).
40. See Ross SANDLER & DAVID SCHOENBROD, DEMOCRACY BY DECREE: WHAT HAPPENS
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character"41 of modem public law litigation and attendant structural relief
means that the "relief ordered often does much more than just prevent or undo
constitutional violations., 42  One scholar has noted: "[T]he trial judge has
increasingly become the creator and manager of complex forms of ongoing
relief, which have widespread effects on persons not before the court and
require the judge's continuing involvement. 4 3 Even outside the institutional
reform context, prophylactic injunctions-those that dictate a defendant's
otherwise legal conduct when that conduct might contribute to the harm-are
not unusual. 44
Some examples convey the breadth of Young relief that has become
prevalent in the last couple decades. In school desegregation cases, the
Supreme Court repeatedly approved decrees that went beyond simply declaring
invalid the previous separation by law of black and white students. The "black
letter" law requires that such decrees-a subset of which arise in Young suits-
(1) "relate[] to 'the condition alleged to offend the Constitution"'; (2) "be
designed as nearly as possible 'to restore the victims of discriminatory conduct
to the position they would have occupied in the absence of such conduct"'; and
(3) "take into account the interests of state and local authorities in managing
WHEN CouRTs RuN GOVERNmENTpassim (2003) (criticizing perceived judicial overreaching in
institutional reform cases); Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89
HARV. L. REV. 1281, 1284 (1976) (describing emerging model of "public law litigation");
William A. Fletcher, The Discretionary Constitution: Institutional Remedies and Judicial
Legitimacy, 91 YALE L.J. 635, 635 (1982) ("The variety and importance of the institutions
involved, the range of issues that courts must address, and most important, the broad
discretionary powers trial courts must exercise in framing remedial decrees set modem
institutional suits substantially apart from other forms of litigation."); Frug, supra note 39, at
751-53 (describing breadth of institutional Young litigation); Donald Horowitz, Decreeing
Organizational Change: Judicial Supervision of Public Institutions, 1983 DUKE L.J. 1265,
1268 (1983) (describing breadth and features of"structural injunctions"); A.E. Dick Howard,
The State and the Supreme Court, 31 CATH. U. L. REv. 375,425-29 (1982) ("Public law today
has increasingly taken on a systematic character. The paradigm lawsuit over constitutional
issues today is ... the class action seeking injunctive relief to significantly alter the way
government carries out some function."); Paul J. Mishkin, Federal Courts as State Reformers,
35 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 949, 949-51 (1978) (discussing "substantial expansion" of federal
courts' use of "institutional decrees"); Robert F. Nagel, Separation of Powers and the Scope of
Federal Equitable Remedies, 30 STAN. L. REv. 661,661-64 (1978) (discussing "innovative and
expansive remedies that federal courts have utilized with increasing frequency, especially
against state governments").
41. Howard, supra note 40, at 425-26.
42. Mishkin, supra note 40, at 956.
43. Chayes, supra note 40, at 1284; see also id. at 1293 (observing that in public law
litigation, "right and remedy are pretty thoroughly disconnected").
44. See Thomas, Prophylactic Remedy, supra note 5, at 302, 313-14 (citing several
examples).
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their own affairs. ',45 Milliken, touched upon earlier, involved the question of
appropriate remedies to redress the effects of dejure segregation in the Detroit
public school system.46 Liability extended not only to local school district
officials but also to State officials, including the Governor of Michigan.47 The
Court in Milliken I did reject a decree providing for inter-district relief-a move
that would have effectively consolidated fifty-four independent school districts
with Detroit city schools and included large-scale pupil reassignment 4 -- on
grounds that the remedy would affect outlying districts that had not been shown
to have committed any constitutional violation.49 But on remand, the district
court ordered other expansive relief, including reading skills programs, special
in-service teacher training, changes in student testing, and counseling. 50
Although the absence of any of these remedies presumably would not violate
Equal Protection requirements, the Court approved them as proper remedial
measures. 51 It further held that the district court could order the State, under
Edelman, to pay for the remedial educational programs.52 The Milliken /! Court
45. Milliken 11, 433 U.S. at 280-81 (quoting Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717,738,746
(1974) [hereinafter Milliken 1]).
46. Id. at 269.
47. Id. at 272 n.6. Although the desegregation decisions do not seem to spend much time
parsing between local and State government officials (the latter of which can seek some
Eleventh Amendment protection), I focus my discussion here on cases in which State officials
were named defendants because those cases, in which the Young doctrine is implicated,
necessarily incorporate any additional limits that the Eleventh Amendment may impose. Indeed,
Milliken I directly addresses the constraints imposed by Young:
The decree to share the future costs of educational components in this case fits
squarely within the prospective-compliance exception reaffirmed by Edelman.
That exception, which had its genesis in Exparte Young, permits federal courts to
enjoin state officials to conform their conduct to requirements of federal law,
notwithstanding a direct and substantial impact on the state treasury.
Id. at 289 (citation omitted).
48. Milliken 1, 418 U.S. at 741-43.
49. Id. at 745; see also Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406,420-21(1977)
(rejecting citywide busing remedy based on lack of showing of"incremental segregative effect"
of violations beyond certain schools). But see Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526,
540-42 (1979) (upholding same citywide remedy based on chain of presumptions linking the
broader harms to the adjudicated violation). Milliken I marked the first time since Brown that
the Court overturned a district court's desegregation decree as going too far. PAUL BREST ET
AL., PROCESSES OF CONsTrrUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING 783 (4th ed. 2000).
50. Milliken II, 433 U.S. at 282.
51. Id. at 288.
52. Id. at 289-90.
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relied in part on Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education,3 in
which the Court approved broad equitable relief such as the targeted use of
racial balancing goals, pupil reassignment, and busing.54 Although State
officials were added as defendants to the suit in Swann, the Supreme Court
made no mention of Eleventh Amendment concerns.55 The Milliken II Court
applied the principle enunciated in Swann that once a right and violation have
been shown, "the scope of a district court's equitable powers to remedy past
wrongs is broad, for breadth and flexibility are inherent in equitable
remedies. 5 6 As one scholar has noted, "once a violation has been proven,
Milliken II shows how sweeping the federal court's remedial powers can be.
5 7
This broad view is also reflected in federal courts of appeals decisions
approving desegregation decrees against State defendants.58
Federal district courts have ordered broad injunctive relief against State
entities and officials in a variety of other contexts as well. 59 Litigation
involving conditions of State-run mental hospitals has resulted in expansive
court-ordered decrees that noticeably exceed the dictates of any well-defined
right. For example, in Wyatt v. Stickney,60 a suit was brought on behalf of
53. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
54. Id at 8-9.
55. See Appendix to Brief for Petitioners at 372, 375, 464-76, 901-03, Swann v.
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971) (No. 281), microformed on U.S.
Supreme Court Records and Briefs (Microform, Inc.) (containing individual orders and
supplemental complaint adding State defendants to suit).
56. Milliken lI, 433 U.S. at 281 (quoting Swann, 402 U.S. at 15). The Court suggested in
Swann that decrees should be designed "to achieve the greatest possible degree of actual
desegregation." Swann, 402 U.S. at 26. Professor Fiss has described Swann approvingly as
"the most untailored remedy imaginable." Owen M. Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term-
Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARv. L. REv. 1, 46 n.94 (1979).
57. Howard, supra note 40, at 429; cf Nagel, supra note 40, at 709 ("Indeed, some courts
have framed their constitutional analysis so that it is nearly impossible to discern whether any
particular part of the court order represents a constitutional requirement or precisely how the
decree might bear on the underlying constitutional violation.").
58. See, e.g., Boston ChapterN.A.A.C.P., Inc. v. Beecher, 504 F.2d 1017, 1022-28 (1st
Cir. 1974) (upholding district court's order-following finding of racial discrimination in the
hiring of firefighters against state and local officials-enjoining use of written test and requiring
future minority hiring preferences); United States v. Bd. of Sch. Comm'rs, 503 F.2d 68, 83 (7th
Cir. 1974) (upholding against state and local officials those portions of extensive court-ordered
desegregation decree that were limited to school district at issue).
59. Cases in these areas have also resulted in consent decrees, discussed infra Part III.B.
60. Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971), on submission ofproposed
standards by defendants, 334 F. Supp. 1341 (M.D. Ala. 1971), enforced, 344 F. Supp. 373,387
(M.D. Ala. 1972), aff'd in material respects sub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th
Cir. 1974). For further commentary on the Wyatt case, see Jack Drake, Judicial Implementation
and Wyatt v. Stickney, 32 ALA. L. REv. 299 passim (1981); Hon. Frank M. Johnson, Jr., The
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mentally-ill persons in Alabama who were civilly committed to a State
hospital. 61 Plaintiffs alleged that the hospital conditions were inhumanely
substandard and amounted to a violation of the patients' constitutional "right to
treatment., 62 The district court agreed and then issued an extensive "remedial"
order regulating details of building structure and operation, environmental
conditions (including temperature of air and running water), hospital
procedures (including specific staffing ratios), and individual patient treatment
63 Alprograms. Indeed, Alabama's spending on mental institutions rose from $14
million in 1971 to $58 million in 1973, one year after the decree was
rendered. 64 As one scholar described it, the "[flederal district court[] largely...
assumed the duties of administering a state mental health system." 65
66
Federal courts have also taken an active role in reforming State prisons.
For example, in Hutto v. Finney, discussed earlier with respect to attorneys'
fees, the Supreme Court upheld a prophylactic injunction against the Arkansas
Department of Corrections, limiting punitive isolation to thirty days even
though the practice itself was found not to violate the Eighth Amendment.67 In
Pugh v. Locke, an Eighth Amendment challenge to the Alabama prison system,
the district court established, among other things, standards for the minimum
number of square feet in a prisoner's cell, the number of minutes of daily
outdoor exercise for prisoners in isolation, the number of urinals to be
provided, and the requirement that each dietary supervisor have at least a
68
bachelor's degree in dietetics.
Notably, the examples cited above are limited to cases reviewed by the
Supreme Court or federal courts of appeal. They do not account for the
Role of the Federal Courts in Institutional Litigation, 32 ALA. L. REV. 271, 275-78 (1981);
Mishkin, supra note 40, at 953-55.
61. Wyatt, 325 F. Supp. at 782.
62. Id. at 785.
63. Id. at 785-86.
64. Horowitz, supra note 40, at 1267.
65. Nagel, supra note 40, at 661.
66. See, e.g., Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. Supp. 318, 331-32 (M.D. Ala. 1976) (ordering
improvements in prisoners' living conditions), aff'd in relevant part sub nom. Newman v.
Alabama, 559 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1977), aff'din relevant part sub nom. Alabama v. Pugh, 438
U.S. 781 (1978); Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362, 382-85 (E.D. Ark. 1970) (ordering
improvements in prisoners' living conditions), aff'd, 442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1971); see also
MALcOLM M. FEELEY & EDWARD L. RUBIN, JUDICIAL POLICY MAKING AND THE MODERN STATE:
How THE COURTS REFORMED AMERICA'S PRISONS 19 (1998) ("The prison cases represented the
collective actions of literally hundreds of federal judges, acting individually.").
67. Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 712 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
68. Pugh, 406 F. Supp. at 332-34; see also Newman, 559 F.2d at 288 (affirming Pugh
district court standards on appeal).
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numerous district court orders providing for broad relief that escape any
appellate review. 69 During this time interval, the Supreme Court intervened in
just a handful of cases to limit equitable relief.70 Indeed, based on the minimal
appellate review, "it is difficult to conclude that the federal courts have been
swayed in any fundamental way from their pattern in exercising equity
powers."
71
3. Rehnquist Court Incursions (1 990s-Present)
The Supreme Court has cut back significantly on desegregation remedies
in recent years.72 But those decisions, for the most part, dissolve previously
valid decrees based on the passage of time, a record of compliance, and
demographic changes rather than speak to the district courts' threshold
remedial power.73 Although those cases have had some limiting effect on the
breadth of equitable relief permitted by lower courts in other contexts,74 the
69. See Horowitz, supra note 40, at 1268 (noting lack of appellate review at remedial
stage).
70. The most notable of these cases outside the desegregation context is Rizzo v. Goode,
423 U.S. 362 (1976). In Rizzo, a federal district judge ordered broad injunctive relief against
the Philadelphia police department based on a class action complaint alleging police abuses
against minority citizens. Rizzo, 423 U.S. at 365. The Supreme Court reversed. Id. at 366. The
Court relied on several factors, including principles of federalism and the lack of a pervasive
pattern of discriminatory acts by the police. Id. at 373-80. But, given that Milliken II came the
year after Rizzo, observers appear largely correct that Rizzo did not mark a sea change in
equitable relief. See Newman, 559 F.2d at 286-88 (acknowledging Supreme Court's decision in
Rizzo but nonetheless affirming much of district court's broad injunctive relief); Howard, supra
note 40, at 427-29 (citing other observers); see also O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 499-503
(1974) (stating in dicta that equitable relief should be limited when unduly intruding into state
criminal processes).
71. Howard, supra note 40, at 428-29.
72. See infra note 73 (citing recent cases); see also BREST ET AL., supra note 49, at 786-
93 (describing Court's imposition of limits on judicial desegregation decrees); Wendy Parker,
The Decline ofJudicialDecisionmaking: School Desegregation andDistrict Court Judges, 81
N.C.L. REv. 1623, 1624-25 (2003) ("Power once defined the school desegregation judge....
That power, however, no longer exists today.").
73. See Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467,495-96 (1992) (remanding for reconsideration of
desegregation decree in operation since 1969 in light of good-faith compliance, demographic
changes, and resegregation as "product not of state action but of private choices"); Bd. of Educ.
v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 248 (1991) (dissolving ten-year-old desegregation decree, noting the
district's compliance "for a reasonable period of time"). But see Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S.
70, 87-94 (1995) (limiting district court's power to enter intradistrict remedial decree providing
for extensive capital, course, and extracurricular improvements when linked to inter-district
goals of racial integration; emphasizing "rightful position" principle and tailoring of remedy to
the violation).
74. See, e.g., Cardenas v. Massey, 269 F.3d 251, 265 (3d Cir. 2001) (rejecting requested
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Court has not intervened much outside the desegregation area: We still see
relatively broad federal court relief against State governmental entities.75 The
shift has primarily been not in the prevalence of such remedies but in the source
of the remedies: Instead of broadly construed constitutional rights, which the
Rehnquist Court has truncated, more extensive congressional statutes provide
the basis for broad judicial relief.
76
Further, notwithstanding the Rehnquist Court's otherwise robust Eleventh
Amendment jurisprudence, potential Eleventh Amendment concerns do not
appear to loom large in the analyses in these cases (despite the fact that State
officials, in addition to local officials, are often the objects of the decrees at
issue). 77 Thus, there appears to be little in the case law-aside from the narrow
exceptions discussed below-that limits the scope of relief available in a Young
suit (assuming it qualifies as prospective under Edelman) beyond that available
in any other suit for equitable relief against a local governmental entity.
prophylactic relief mandating adoption of antidiscrimination policy regarding race, because it
would not have prevented future harm to plaintiff who was no longer employed by State
defendants).
75. See, e.g., Armstrong v. Davis, 275 F.3d 849, 871-72 (9th Cir. 2001) (upholding
extensive, system-wide injunction based on allegations that California's policies and practices
for parole and parole revocation proceedings violated Americans with Disabilities Act and
Rehabilitation Act); see also SANDLER & SCHOENBROD, supra note 40, at 10-11 ("[Alcademic
interest may have waned, but the incidence and effect of institutional reform litigation have
not."). But see Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 356-60 (1996) (rejecting as overly broad district
court's order aimed at improving management of prison library rather than legal wrong of
denying prisoners' access to courts and other measures not directed at illiterate prisoners); id at.
392 (Thomas, J., concurring) (same). Congress has intervened to a limited extent in the prison
reform area. See Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A) (2000)
(limiting injunctive relief in prison reform cases to that "necessary" to cure constitutional
violation).
76. See SANDLER & SCHOENBROD, supra note 40, at 10-11 ("The Supreme Court's
opinions [limiting constitutional remedies] in any event have been utterly overshadowed by
congressional enactments over the past thirty years that make it easy to prove a statutory case
against state and local defendants.").
77. One possible explanation for the lack of concern for State sovereign immunity is that
most of the aforementioned cases involve constitutional claims based on violations of rights
arising under the Fourteenth Amendment and, as such, the sovereign immunity defense is
arguably weaker or inapplicable. Jesse H. Choper & John C. Yoo, Who's So Afraid of the
Eleventh Amendment: The Limited Impact of the Court's Sovereign Immunity Rulings, 105
COLt M. L. REv. (forthcoming 2005) (manuscript at 16 & n.93, on file with authors). However,
while affirming Congress's power to abrogate State immunity pursuant to Section 5, the
Supreme Court has not stated that the Eleventh Amendment does not apply to any suit alleging a
direct violation of substantive Fourteenth Amendment rights. More relevant, as the Supreme
Court's decisions in Milliken H and Hutto demonstrate (in addition to numerous federal courts
of appeals decisions before and after), courts have generally assumed that the Eleventh
Amendment does in fact apply in such suits but, nevertheless, have upheld broad remedies
against State entities.
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Nevertheless, the Rehnquist Court has placed some direct limits on the
Young doctrine in the last ten years. These limits come from two cases:
Seminole Tribe v. Florida78 and Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe.79 In Seminole
Tribe, an Indian tribe brought suit in federal court against Florida and its
governor to compel compliance with the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act
(IGRA), under which States have a duty to negotiate in good faith with a tribe
with the end goal of forming a compact governing gaming activities. 80 The
State defendants moved to dismiss the suit on the ground that it violated
Florida's Eleventh Amendment immunity.81 In the better known part of its
opinion, the Supreme Court agreed that the State enjoyed sovereign immunity
under these facts and, overruling Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co.,82 that
Congress could not abrogate that immunity pursuant to its Article I powers.
83
The case still left the question of whether the statutory duty could nevertheless
be enforced against the governor (as opposed to the State) pursuant to the
Young doctrine. After all, the tribe sought prospective injunctive relief in order
to end an ongoing violation of federal law, meeting the elements normally
necessary to overcome the Eleventh Amendment bar. However, the Court
denied relief under Young. The Court stated that where, as in IGRA, Congress
has prescribed a detailed remedial scheme for the enforcement against a State
of a statutorily created right, a court should hesitate before casting aside those
limitations and permitting a Young action.84 According to the Court, IGRA's
intricate enforcement procedures showed that Congress intended not only to
define, but also to limit significantly, the duty to negotiate.85 The Court found
that IGRA mandates only a modest set of regulations where an agreement is not
reached through negotiation or mediation.86 In contrast, the Court reasoned, a
Young action would expose a State official to a federal court's full remedial
powers, including contempt sanctions. 87 Enforcement through Young would
render IGRA's intricate enforcement scheme superfluous, the Court
78. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
79. Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261 (1997).
80. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 51-52.
81. Id. at52.
82. Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989) (holding that Congress may
authorize suits against States pursuant to its Article I powers).
83. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 59-63.
84. Id. at 74-75.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 75.
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hypothesized, as tribes would opt to proceed via Young instead. 8 The Court
was not moved by the fact that it had just held this very scheme unavailable.
In Coeur d'Alene, an Indian tribe, alleging ownership in the beds and
banks of a lake and its tributaries lying within the boundaries of its reservation,
brought a federal-court action against Idaho and various State officials.8 9 The
tribe sought, inter alia, a declaratory judgment establishing its entitlement to
the exclusive right to quiet enjoyment of the submerged lands, a declaration of
the invalidity of all Idaho laws purporting to regulate those lands, and an
injunction prohibiting defendants from taking any action in violation of the
tribe's right in the lands. 90 The Supreme Court held that the suit was barred by
the Eleventh Amendment and rejected application of the Young doctrine to the
State officials. 9 The Court acknowledged that the tribe did allege an ongoing
violation of its property rights under federal law and did seek prospective
injunctive relief-ordinarily sufficient to invoke the Young doctrine.92 The
Court, however, found this case exceptional because the tribe's suit was the
functional equivalent of a quiet title action implicating special sovereignty
interests.93 The Court found the suit especially troubling because the tribe's
requested relief would have divested the State of its property interest and
control over vast areas of submerged lands, historically considered uniquely
"sovereign lands. ' '94
These two cases have generated substantial commentary, a vast majority of
which has characterized the cases as constituting a narrowing trend with serious
potential to limit the Young doctrine. 95 I disagree. There are numerous reasons
88. Id.





94. Id. at 283.
95. See, e.g., Barsalou & Stengel, supra note 10, at 456 (asserting that Court's recent
jurisprudence has narrowed Young); Vicki C. Jackson, Seminole Tribe, The Eleventh
Amendment, and the Potential Evisceration of Ex Parte Young, 72 N.Y.U. L. REv. 495, 498,
510, 530 (1997) (criticizing Seminole Tribe); John P. LaVelle, Sanctioning a Tyranny: The
Diminishment ofEx Parte Young Expansion ofHans Immunity, and Denial ofIndian Rights in
Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 31 ARIz. ST. L.J. 787, 867 (1999) ("The Rehnquist Court's Coeur d'Alene
Tribe decision thus represents a manifestation of profound injustice-the very kind of injustice,
in fact, that the doctrine of Ex parte Young was designed to protect against."); Nathan C.
Thomas, Note, The Withering Doctrine ofEx Parte Young, 83 CoRNELLL. REv. 1068, 1070-71
(1998) (arguing that "the Seminole decision added a new inquiry that narrowed the doctrine's
application" and that "Coeur d'Alene's intimation of a new approach in Exparte Young cases
further limits the effectiveness of the doctrine[]"); Leading case, Ex Parte Young Doctrine, 111
1019
62 WASH. &LEE L. REV 1001 (2005)
why these two cases are not indicative of a broader trend. First, the Court's
assumption that contempt sanctions would apply in Seminole Tribe reveals the
Court's broad conception of Young.96 Second, Seminole Tribe's holding as to
Young's applicability reflects more a concern about separation of powers,
respecting Congress, than federalism (though that is somewhat ironic given the
Court's striking of the congressional scheme as unenforceable in the prior part
of the opinion).97 Thus, the applicability and scope of Young relief remain
unaffected in the heartland of non-statutory or constitutional claims. Third,
Seminole Tribe's concern with deferring to Congress's intricate remedial
schemes has not yet carried over to any cases involving other detailed federal
statutes. In Board of Trustees v. Garrett (discussed infra Part III.C), for
example, the Court expressly assumes when rejecting monetary relief against
the State that Young relief would still be available to enforce Title I of the
Americans with Disabilities Act.98 Fourth, shifting to Coeur d'Alene, only the
Chief Justice joined the portion of Justice Kennedy's lead opinion that sought
to make further inroads on Young.99 Indeed, Justice O'Connor, joined by
Justices Scalia and Thomas, wrote separately to expressly reject Justice
Kennedy's stricter approach, concluding that it "unnecessarily recharacterizes
and narrows much of our Young jurisprudence."'10 Combined with the four
dissenters, a total of seven justices thus eschewed a further constriction of
Young doctrine.' 0 ' Finally, the two cases appear more concerned with limiting
HARv. L. REv. 269, 278 (1997) ("The Court's decision in Coeur d'Alene carved a new and very
narrow exception to Young for submerged lands."). But see David P. Currie, Response: Ex
Parte Young After Seminole Tribe, 72 N.Y.U. L. REv. 547,547, 551 (1997) ("Not to worry; Ex
parte Young is alive and well and living in the Supreme Court." (footnote omitted)); Daniel J.
Meltzer, The Seminole Decision and State Sovereign Immunity, 1996 Sup. CT. REv. 1, 44-46 ("I
do not read the Court's action as evidence that Exparte Young is on its deathbed." (footnote
omitted)); Henry Paul Monaghan, The Sovereign Immunity "Exception," 110 HARv. L. REV.
102, 128-32 (1996) (arguing that Seminole Tribe does not disturb Young doctrine).
96. See Jackson, supra note 95, at 516-17 (criticizing Court's assumption that relief
available in Young action would be greater than that available under statute or that parties
sought such broader relief).
97. Leonard, supra note 21, at 264-65 & n.375.
98. See Bd. of Trs. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 374 n.9 (2001) ("Title I of the ADA... can
be enforced.., by private individuals in actions for injunctive relief under Exparte Young.").
The Supreme Court has thus far declined the invitation to obviate Young in the enforcement of
other federal statutes, such as the Clean Water Act. See NRDC v. Cal. Dep't of Transp., 96 F.3d
420, 424 (9th Cir. 1996) (O'Scannlain, J., concurring) (requesting Supreme Court's attention to
question of availability of Young for federal statutory claims).
99. Coeur d'Alene, 521 U.S. at 263.
100. Id. at 291-97 (O'Connor, J., concurring).




the availability of Young in relatively unique situations (detailed statutory
schemes benefiting Indians and quiet title actions brought by Indians against a
State) than with reducing the type or scope of Young relief in the ordinary case,
such as those discussed supra Part II.A.2.
For those unconvinced by these arguments, two more recent cases-which
have received much less attention thus far-buck the perceived trend and
largely render the concerns moot: Verizon Maryland Inc. v. Public Service
Commission10 2 and Frew. In Verizon, the State regulatory commission ordered
Verizon, the local phone company (incumbent local-exchange carrier), to
compensate its competitors for certain calls made by its customers.'0 3 Verizon
then sued the commission and its individual members in federal court. °4
Verizon alleged that the commission's order was in violation of the federal
telecommunications law and a related FCC ruling. 0 5 Verizon sought both
declaratory relief that the order was unlawful and injunctive relief against its
enforcement. 10 6 The lower courts dismissed the suit, stating that the Young
doctrine did not permit suit against the individual State officials. 0 7 The
Supreme Court unanimously reversed. 0 8 The Court stated that a court need
only conduct a "straightforward inquiry" into whether the complaint alleges an
ongoing violation of federal law and seeks relief properly characterized as
prospective.'0 9 The Court stated that Verizon's requested relief clearly satisfied
that inquiry." 0 Although the requested declaration would speak to the past as
well as the future, the Court pointed out that the State's past liability was not at
issue."' The Court also rejected the argument that the federal statute at issue
constituted an exclusive remedial scheme, like the one held in Seminole Tribe
to exclude Young actions." 2
102. Verizon Md. Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 535 U.S. 635 (2002).
103. Id. at 639.




108. Justice Kennedy concurred separately to re-emphasize his narrower approach from
Coeur d'Alene. Verizon, 535 U.S. at 648-49 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Not even the Chief,
however, joined him.
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Verizon is seen by many observers as signaling an end to any potential
anti-Young momentum from Seminole Tribe and Coeur d'Alene."3 I save
discussion of Frew until Part II.C infra, but suffice it to note that in it, the
Court-via a 9-0 opinion written by Justice Kennedy-implicitly endorsed a
broad conception as to the permissible scope of Young relief. As Professor




Despite my assertions that the scope of permissible injunctive relief
under Young has generally increased over time, one could reasonably read the
Rehnquist Court's limitations on equitable authority as indicative of a new
trend designed to narrow the scope of district court injunctions against State
entities. But to the extent the Supreme Court has otherwise limited the scope
of a district court's equitable authority in recent years, consent decrees have
remained a relatively undisturbed bastion of broad relief sanctioned by
federal courts. Even more than a district court's traditional injunctive relief,
consent decrees provide a fitting analogue to Congress's Section 5 remedial
power. This section discusses the general nature of consent decrees and how
the Supreme Court has treated them, followed by a discussion of consent
decrees specifically involving State officials, focusing on the Frew case from
the 2003 term.
Consent decrees-a subcategory of equitable relief-are special because
of their hybrid nature: part contract and part court order. Like a contract, a
consent decree embodies a voluntary agreement among the parties.'15
According to the Court: "The parties waive their right to litigate the issues
involved in the case and thus save themselves the time, expense, and
inevitable risk of litigation." ' 16 Consent decrees typically disclaim any
concession of liability," 7  although a decree can include some
113. See, e.g., Helen D. Silver, Verizon Maryland, Inc. v. Public Service Commission of
Maryland: Reaffirming Ex Parte Young and the Necessity of Finding Regulatory Hand-Back
Schemes To Be a Gift or Gratuity, 52 EMORY L.J. 1519, 1540-47 (2003) (noting that Court's
decision in Verizon "dispels many doubts as to the continuing validity of Exparte Young").
114. David P. Currie, Response: Ex Parte Young After Seminole Tribe, 72 N.Y.U. L. REv.
547, 547 (1997) (footnote omitted).
115. Local No. 93, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 521-22
(1986).
116. Id. at 522 (quoting United States v. Armour & Co., 402 U.S. 673, 681 (1971)).
117. Maimon Schwarzschild, Public Law by Private Bargain: Title VII Consent Decrees
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admissions 1 8 or can even follow ajudicial determination of liability." 9 Like a
typical injunction, a consent decree is also an enforceable judicial order that is
"subject to the rules generally applicable to other judgments and decrees."' 120
For example, the court retains the power to modify a consent decree in certain
circumstances over the objection of a signatory, 12 1 and noncompliance with a
consent decree is enforceable by citation for contempt of court. 122 As the
Supreme Court has stated, "A federal court is more than 'a recorder of
contracts' from whom parties can purchase injunctions; it is 'an organ of
government constituted to make judicial decisions."
23
Consent decrees are common in some of the same areas ("structural" or
"institutional reform" cases) where broad injunctions have been ordered.
124
and the Fairness of Negotiated Institutional Reform, 1984 DUKE L.J. 887, 895 (1984).
118. See Firefighters, 478 U.S. at 512 (noting city's "express admission" that it had
engaged in discrimination).
119. See Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 372-74 (1992) (upholding
consent decree entered after finding of liability). It is not clear to me what impact, if any, the
judicial determination or concession of liability might have on the scope of relief available
under a consent decree. On the one hand, one could argue that such a determination justifies
broader boundaries since it has been established that the State has actually been in violation of
federal law. On the other hand, perhaps the terms of the decree must then be based on the
adjudicated or admitted violations rather than the complaint, which would tend to narrow the
scope of permissible relief. The Court's test in Firefighters-in which there was no
adjudication but the defendant admitted at least some liability-does not distinguish between
the various scenarios. The consent decree in Frew was entered without any determination or
concession of liability.
120. Id. at 378.
121. See Frew exrel. Frewv. Hawkins, 540 U.S. 431,441 (2004) (acknowledging district
court's modification power under Rule 60(b)(5)); Rufo, 502 U.S. at 384-91 (rejecting higher
"grievous wrong" standard for modification of consent decrees in institutional reform context in
favor of more flexible standard under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(5), but still
requiring that party seeking modification bear burden of establishing that significant change in
facts or law warrants revision of decree and that proposed modification is suitably tailored to
changed circumstances); Firefighters, 478 U.S. at 518 (citing United States v. Swift & Co., 286
U.S. 106, 114 (1932)) ("[T]he court retains the power to modify a consent decree in certain
circumstances over the objection of a signatory.").
122. See Local No. 93, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 518
(1986) (citing United States v. City of Miami, 664 F.2d 435,440 & n.8 (5th Cir. 1981) (Rubin,
J., concurring)) ("[N]oncompliance with a consent decree is enforceable by citation for
contempt of court."); cf Spallone v. United States, 493 U.S. 265, 276 (1990) (recognizing
inherent power of courts to enforce compliance with their consent decrees).
123. Firefighters, 478 U.S. at 525 (quoting lB JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S
FEDERAL PRACTICE 0.409[5], at 331 (1984)).
124. See Schwarzschild, supra note 117, at 888 (noting that consent decrees "are now
common in every variety of lawsuit over public policy, including environmental cases, litigation
over the rights of the institutionalized, school and housing desegregation suits, and equal
employment litigation" (footnotes omitted)).
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Consent decrees, however, can be even more expansive than other equitable
judicial relief. To be valid, a consent decree must simply (1) "resolve a dispute
within the court's subject-matter jurisdiction," (2) "'[come] within the general
scope of the case made by the pleadings,"' and (3) "further the objectives of the
law upon which the complaint was based." 125  Although much turns on
application, the phrasing appears to permit relief broader than that in Milliken II
and certainly does not reflect the specific mandate to tailor the remedy to the harm
embodied in the more recent desegregation cases.' 26 Indeed, the Supreme Court
has made clear that "a federal court is not necessarily barred from entering a
consent decree merely because the decree provides broader relief than the court
could have awarded after a trial."'
127
For example, in Rufo, inmate-plaintiffs and jail official-defendants agreed to
a consent decree to resolve the inmates' claim that jail conditions violated the
Constitution. 128 The decree required single bunking in jail cells. 29 Defendants
then sought to modify the decree in light of a subsequent Supreme Court decision
clarifying that double celling is not unconstitutional in all cases. 130 The Court
stated that, because the controlling law did not forbid single celling, the parties
were free to agree to that condition:
[Parties can] settle the dispute over the proper remedy for the constitutional
violations that had been found by undertaking to do more than the
Constitution itself requires (almost any affirmative decree beyond a directive
to obey the Constitution necessarily does that), but also more than what a
court would have ordered absent the settlement. 13
Accordingly, the Court held, the district court did not necessarily err in
entering the consent decree.' 32 The Court concluded that modification would
only be warranted if there had been a misunderstanding of the governing law at
the time the decree was enacted. 1
33
A consent decree's breadth is further enhanced by the class action nature of
litigation often giving rise to such relief, as most consent decrees provide for
125. Firefighters, 478 U.S. at 525 (alteration in original) (quoting Pac. R.R. v. Ketchum,
101 U.S. 289, 297 (1880)).
126. See supra Parts II.A.2 and II.A.3 (summarizing developments in Young doctrine since
1970s).
127. Firefighters, 478 U.S. at 525.
128. Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 374-75 (1992).
129. Id. at 375.
130. Id. it 376.
131. Id. at 389 (emphasis added).
132. Id.
133. Id. at 389-91.
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some type of class-wide relief that often affects people who are not parties to the
suit.' 34 For example, the Court in Firefighters, in approving entry of a consent
decree based on a class action alleging racial discrimination in employment, held
that the decree may include race-conscious relief that benefits individuals who are
not actual victims of that discrimination.'
35
Although the law ordinarily permits federal district courts to enter broad
consent relief, that does not necessarily mean that courts enjoy the same power
when State (as opposed to private or local governmental) entities are the subject
of the consent decree. The Eleventh Amendment and the Young doctrine could,
in theory, pose certain additional constraints. Nevertheless, in addition to Rufo, in
which State officials were among the named defendants, 36 broad consent decrees
have been entered against State officials in many lower court cases.' 3 7 The
Supreme Court recently tackled this issue directly in Frew ex rel. Frew v.
Hawkins, the subject of the next section.
C. Frew ex rel. Frew v. Hawkins
In Frew, the Court had to determine whether a federal court could hold State
officials to the terms of a consent decree arising out of a suit challenging Texas's
134. Schwarzschild, supra note 117, at 889.
135. Firefighters, 478 U.S. at 516-25.
136. See Rufo, 502 U.S. at 372-73 & n.2 (noting lower court determination that state
official was proper party to lawsuit).
137. See, e.g., Jeff D. v. Kempthome, 365 F.3d 844, 854 (9th Cir. 2004) (upholding
consent decree relating to state-run mental health facility); see infra notes 209-14 and
accompanying text; Johnson v. Florida, 348 F.3d 1334, 1339 (1 1th Cir. 2003) (upholding
consent decree relating to state-run mental health facility providing for, inter alia, specific
"community living" arrangements well beyond federal law standards); Sweeton v. Brown, Nos.
90-1800, 90-1807, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 22211, at *26 (6th Cir. Sept. 17, 1991) (listed in
table at 944 F.2d 805) (upholding consent decree relating to state-prison parole procedures);
Thompson v. Enomoto, 915 F.2d 1383, 1390-91 (9th Cir. 1990) (upholding modified consent
decree relating to prison conditions for death-row inmates; summarily rejecting Eleventh
Amendment defense based on Exparte Young); Duran v. Carruthers, 885 F.2d 1485, 1490 (10th
Cir. 1989) (upholding over 100-page consent decree relating to many aspects of prison
operation; explicitly rejecting Eleventh Amendment defense that decree extended too far beyond
federal law); Kozlowski v. Coughlin, 871 F.2d 241, 244 (2d Cir. 1989) (upholding consent
decree relating to prison visitation); Tonya K. v. Bd. of Educ., 847 F.2d 1243, 1249 (7th Cir.
1988) (upholding consent decree relating to school compliance with federal statute governing
treatment of handicapped children, including attorneys' fees provision despite uncertainty of
legal requirement); Wis. Hosp. Ass'n v. Reivitz, 820 F.2d 863, 868 (7th Cir. 1987) (rejecting
Eleventh Amendment defense to Medicaid-related decree); cf R.C. v. Hornsby, No. 88-H-i 170-
N, at 1 n. 1 (M.D. Ala. 1991) (acknowledging in consent decree that "each party has been able to
obtain favorable outcomes that might have been beyond his reach if the case had been decided
by the Court instead of resolved through negotiations").
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compliance with a portion of the federal Medicaid law. 38 As a participant in the
Medicaid program, Texas must meet certain federal requirements, including a
requirement that it have an Early and Periodic Screening, Diagnosis, and Treatment
(EPSDT) program for children. 139 The Frew plaintiffs, mothers of EPSDT eligible
children, claimed that the Texas program did not meet federal EPSDT standards. 4°
They sought injunctive relief against State officials in federal court. 4' The district
court certified a class of over one million indigent children in Texas. 142 After two
years of negotiations but before trial, the State officials submitted to a detailed,
eighty-page consent decree approved by the district court. 143 In contrast with the
federal statute's brief and general mandate, the decree imposed comprehensive
obligations and procedures and required State officials to implement many specific
proposals.'44
Two years later, plaintiffs alleged that the State was not complying with the
terms of the decree and moved to enforce several of its provisions. 45 The district
court agreed with the plaintiffs, and rejected the State officials' argument that the
Eleventh Amendment rendered the decree unenforceable. 146 The Fifth Circuit
reversed, holding that the Eleventh Amendment prevented enforcement of the
decree because the decree violations did not also constitute violations of the
Medicaid Act.1
47
The Supreme Court reversed 9-0, finding the consent decree enforceable
under Exparte Young even if the decree violations were not violations of federal
law.148  The Court started by recognizing the intersection of the Eleventh
Amendment and the rules governing consent decrees. 149 The State officials argued
that this intersection endangered Eleventh Amendment protections in the following
way: (1) Ex parte Young provides an exception to the general rule of State
immunity from suit. (2) Consent decrees allow State officials to bind the State to
significantly more commitments than federal law requires. (3) Permitting the
enforcement of such decrees threatens to expand the Young exception, and thereby
138. Frew ex rel. Frew v. Hawkins, 540 U.S. 431, 433 (2004).
139. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396a(a)(43), 1396d(r) (2000).
140. Frew, 540 U.S. at 434 (2004).
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 434-35.
144. Id. at 435.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 435-36.
147. Frazar v. Gilbert, 300 F.3d 530, 543-48 (5th Cir. 2002).
148. Frew, 540 U.S. at 436-40.
149. Id. at 437.
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circumvent Eleventh Amendment protections, since it would give courts jurisdiction
over not just federal law, but also everything else to which State officials had
agreed.' 50  The Court, however, was not convinced. The Court concluded
(somewhat facilely on the assumption that the decree was properly entered) that the
consent decree constituted "a remedy consistent with Ex pane Young and
Firefighters."'5' Thus, the Court held that its enforcement did not violate the
Eleventh Amendment. 5 2 The Court relegated the State's federalism and state
separation-of-powers concerns to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(5), which
permits a party to move for modification if a decree is no longer equitable.
53
The Court's relatively terse opinion merits some further scrutiny. Although
the State only contested the enforcement of the decree, as opposed to the validity of
its entry, the entry-enforcement distinction seems immaterial in light of the Court's
conclusion, based on Hutto v. Finney, that "[o]nce entered, a consent decree maybe
enforced.,' 54 In other words, whether Ex parte Young permits enforcement of a
consent decree is the exact same question as whether Young permits a district court
to approve that relief in the first place. The Court, however, provides little guidance
as to when a district court has exceeded its authority under Young to approve a
consent decree.
A pictorial representation may help convey the potential differences between
the scope of federal law, ordinary Young relief, and consent decrees:
155
(1) (2) (3)
In each diagram, the inner circle represents the scope of federal law and the outer
circle represents the permissible scope of a consent decree under Firefighters. The
crosshatched area represents the expanding scope of permissible Young relief.
Frew seems to have placed it closer to that in diagram (3).
150. Id. at 438.
151. Id.at439.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 441 ("When a federal court has entered a consent decree under Exparte Young,
the law's primary response to these concerns has its source not in the Eleventh Amendment but
in the court's equitable powers and the direction given by the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.").
154. Id. at 440.
155. I credit Gregory Rapawy, a former colleague, for helping to conceptualize the problem
through the use of concentric circles.
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The Court explicitly rejected the State's position that only decree
terms coinciding with federal law were enforceable under Young
[diagram (1)].156 The Court's cursory analysis, largely lumping together
Young and Firefighters, could be read to support the broad proposition
that if a suit alleging an ongoing violation of federal law seeks
prospective injunctive relief and if the resulting consent decree satisfies
the Firefighters criteria, then the decree is enforceable against State
officials under Young [diagram (3)]. In theory, a future case could still
find a consent decree consistent with Firefighters but beyond Young
[diagram (2)],'" but the Court does not indicate how such analysis might
proceed nor do the lower courts thus far seem eager to figure it out. 158
Notably, aside from a single example, 59 the Supreme Court did not
in its opinion compare the challenged provisions of the consent decree
with the applicable Medicaid provisions. Such a comparison, however,
reveals the striking breadth of the Frew decision. In relevant part, the
Medicaid statute requires that the State plan provide for the following:
(A) informing all persons in the State who are under the age of 21
[and qualify for Medicaid] of the availability of early and periodic
screening, diagnosis, and treatment [EPSDT] services as described in
156. Frew ex rel. Frew v. Hawkins, 540 U.S. 431,438 (2004).
157. Surely this would happen if the consent decree provided for retrospective money
damages. But here I am referring more to scope of relief rather than type of relief issues. For
example, the Court could have held (but did not) that Young limits the scope of permissible
prospective relief in consent decree cases to the relief available in more traditional injunctive
relief cases, notwithstanding the Firefighters test.
158. See infra notes 209-14 and accompanying text (describing case upholding consent
decree relating to State-run mental health facility).
159. Justice Kennedy provides this lone example to "illustrate[] the nature of the
difference" between the decree and the statute:
The ESPDT statute requires States to "provid[e] or arrang[e] for the provision
of... screening services in all cases where they are requested," and also to arrange
for "corrective treatment" in such cases. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396a(a)(43)(B), (C). The
consent decree implements the provision in part by directing the Texas Department
of Health to staff and maintain toll-free telephone numbers for eligible recipients
who seek assistance in scheduling and arranging appointments. Consent Decree
241-42, Lodging of Petitioners 63-64. According to the decree, the advisors at
the toll-free numbers must furnish the name, address, and telephone numbers of one
or more health care providers in the appropriate specialty in a convenient location,
and they also must assist with transportation arrangements to and from
appointments. Id., In 243-45, Lodging of Petitioners 64. The advisers must
inform recipients enrolled in managed care health plans that they are free to choose
a primary care physician upon enrollment. Id. 244, Lodging of Petitioners 64.
Frew ex rel. Frew v. Hawkins, 540 U.S. 431,435 (2004) (alterations and citations in original).
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[§ 1396d(r)] and the need for age-appropriate immunizations against
vaccine-preventable diseases,
(B) providing or arranging for the provision of such screening
services in all cases where they are requested,
(C) arranging for (directly or through referral to appropriate
agencies, organizations, or individuals) corrective treatment the need
for which is disclosed by such child health screening services, and
(D) reporting to the Sccretary [annually in a manner established by
the Secretary] the following information relating to [EPSDT] services
provided under the plan during each fiscal year:
(i) the number of children provided child health screening
services,
(ii) the number of children referred for corrective treatment
(the need for which is disclosed by such child health screening
services),
(iii) the number of children receiving dental services, and
(iv) the State's results in attaining the participation goals set
for the State under [§ 1396d(r)]. 
16
0
Section 1396d(r) defines EPSDT services, in relevant part, as follows:
medical checkups according to a properly prescribed schedule and at
other intervals when needed, "which shall at a minimum include-
(i) a comprehensive health and developmental history
(including assessment of both physical and mental health
development),
(ii) a comprehensive unclothed physical exam,
(iii) appropriate immunizations... according to age and
health history,
(iv) laboratory tests (including lead blood level assessment
appropriate for age and risk factors), and
160. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(43) (2000).
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(v) health education (including anticipatory guidance)"161;
dental services including checkups according to a properly prescribed
schedule and treatment, "which shall at a minimum include relief of
pain and infections, restoration of teeth, and maintenance of dental
health" 162; and
the full range of healthcare services allowed by the federal Medicaid
statute, including but not limited to case management.'
63
From this single page of basic federal statutory mandates, the district
court approved provisions amounting to a nearly eighty-page consent
decree. Here are some of the provisions that the Supreme Court's
decision effectively deems proper relief within a federal court's Exparte
Young authority, compared to the closest federal law mandate:
Issue Consent Decree Provisions Federal Law
Medical and * Recipients entitled to regular medical Provide or
dental screens and dental checkups 164  arrange for
M State must conduct additional outreach checkups on
for missed checkups' 65  periodic basis;
M State must provide dental "scans" and provide basic
tooth sealants to recipients 166  dental services
listed above'
6 7
161. 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(r)(l)(B) (2000).
162. 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(r)(3)(B) (2000).
163. 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(r)(5) (2000).
164. Consent Decree 2-3, Frew v. McKinney, No. 3:93CV65 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 16, 1996)
[hereinafter Decree].
165. Decree IM 35-37.
166. Decree 154-59.
167. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396a(a)(43)(B), (C), 1396d(r)(1), (3) (2000).
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168. Decree 32; see also Frew v. Gilbert, 109 F. Supp. 2d 579, 589 (E.D. Tex. 2000) ("The
decree elaborates in detail the defendants' obligations to conduct outreach efforts aimed at increasing




172. Decree 138; see also id. IM 25-64 (setting forth guidelines for outreach).
173. Decree IM 68-71.
174. Decree 73.
175. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(aX43XA) (2000).
Issue Consent Decree Provisions Federal Law
Outreach 0 Outreach unit staffing requirements168  Inform eligible
a Oral outreach must "effectively inform persons of the
recipients about the benefits of preventive health availability of
care, that services are free of charge, how to EPSDT
locate a provider who is willing to provide services
services to EPSDT recipients, how to schedule
appointments and how to schedule
transportation assistance"1
69
a Outreach information must be "reasonably
interesting," "sensitive to ... different cultural
backgrounds," and presented in an encouraging
and convenient manner
170
0 Requiring certain written materials,
including bilingual "reminder letters" subject to
numerous detailed specifications
171
a Outreach units must adhere to numerous
guidelines, for example use of "highly visual"
materials about dental issues including
photographs of healthy mouths and common
dental problems
172
0 Requiring preparation of materials for
inter-agency healthcare handbooks
173
0 Requiring implementation of media
marketing plan 74
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Issue Consent Decree Provisions Federal Law
Training of • Requiring EPSDT training at State Train
health care professional schools and other ongoing subprofessional
providers professional training relating to, inter alia, staff'
mental health services, new issues, and cultural
sensitivity 17 7
" Requiring training for pharmacists
" Provision of training scholarships and
training of all managed-care providers and staff
about EPSDT requirements including terms of
the decree1
78
Managed care/ * Mandating ninety-day deadline for n/a
Migrant checkups of new managed care enrollees and
workers accelerated services to migrant children'
80
0 Requiring door-to-door and priority
outreach for migrant farmworkers1
8
1
Toll-free V Detailed requirements as to operation of Inform and
telephone toll-free assistance, including inter alia the arrange for
services linkage of transportation and scheduling provision of
assistance; a well-trained, knowledgeable, polite EPSDT
staff; prompt service; non-English speaker services8 3
arrangements; and bar on tape recordings during
work hours
82
Case a Requiring complete plan for "sufficient" Provide case
management case management services in every county, management
services including methods to encourage acceptance of services when
case management184 necessary for
treatment
85
Transportation * Requiring "comprehensive" annual Arrange for
assessments of the transportation program provision of
studies' 86  EPSDT
" Increase mileage reimbursement rate 8 7  services' 89
" Modifying transportation regulations to




176. Decree IM 107-20.
177. Decree I 124-30.
178. DecreeIl 131,194.
179. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(aX4)(B) (2000).
180. Decree In 190,192.
181. Decree j 181-83.
182. Decree I 242-47.
183. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396a(aX43XA), (B) (2000).
184. Decree In 248, 264-65.
185. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396d(aX9), 1396d(r)(5), 1396n(g)(2) (2000).
186. Decree I 223-29.
187. Decree 232.
188. Decree 238.
189. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396a(a)(43)(B) (2000); see also 42 C.F.R. §§ 431.53, 440.170 (2004)
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Issue Consent Decree Provisions Federal Law
Monitoring/ Reporting requirements relating to, inter Make reports
reporting alia, outreach;' ° dental checkups;' 9 managed required by the
requirements care performance; 192 checkups of abused Secretary; report
children;193 data on those receiving all scheduled number of
checkups beyond HCFA requirements; 194  children
statistics measuring program's statewideness' 9  receiving
EPSDT
services' 9
Outcome * Creation of health outcome indicators, n/a
measures target goals for each indicator, and related
reporting requirements
197
Corrective W Mandating plans for counties that lag Inform, arrange,
plans behind statewide average for checkups'98  provide EPSDT
a Mandating plans for improving outcome services for "all"
indicators noted above with deadlines 99  eligible
persons2°°
Other * Requiring State to develop capacity to n/a
miscellaneous conduct epidemiologic studies2 0
provisions 0 Requiring simplified paperwork20 2
a Recruitment of professional schools,
family-planning agencies, and school districts
20 3
The discrepancy between the scope of Medicaid requirements and the
scope of consent relief, apparent from the chart, leads to a few additional
observations. As the Fifth Circuit indicated, the Medicaid statute states only
that the State plan must "provide for" the advertising, providing, and arranging
of EPSDT services, not that the State must actually provide services in every
(establishing transportation requirements).





195. Decree 7 277-80.
196. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396a(a)(6), (43)(D) (2000).
197. Decree M 288-89, 293-95.
198. Decree 7281.
199. Decree 296.
200. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(43) (2000); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(1) (2000)
(establishing "statewideness" requirement).
201. Decree$ 9.
202. Decree 7 90.
203. Decree77 102, 139-41.
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case.204 Similarly, although the district court proffers a three-pronged definition
of "effective" outreach, its interpretation places a greater burden on the State
than the statutory requirement that the State plan just be "designed to" be
effective.2 °5
Other decree provisions are far less tailored. For example, the statute
makes no mention of migrant workers. Several decree provisions, in contrast,
create special requirements expressly for that population. Further, the statute
says nothing about the training of medical professionals (just staff) while the
decree speaks extensively to training of doctors, dentists, pharmacists, and
others in a host of areas. And the transportation provisions go far beyond the
minimal statutory requirement that the State "arrange" for the provision of
EPSDT services.
One might argue that the broad approval of such relief under the Young
doctrine can be explained as a reaction to the State's shameless attempt to duck
enforcement of a consent decree. Although the State's unseemly behavior may
have had some effect on the eventual outcome, the Court did not have to go
down the path it chose to reach the same result. In fact, the plaintiffs' lead
argument before the Court was that under Lapides v. Board of Regents of the
University System, 206 the State had waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity
when State officials initially agreed to entry of the consent decree.20 7 Not only
is this argument eminently reasonable, it seems analytically cleaner and would
avoid any ancillary expansion of equitable relief in the context of Young. But
the Court explicitly and unanimously chose not to address that argument and
decided the case on Young grounds instead.20 8 The literature chronicling the
narrowing (if not death) of Young relief in the Rehnquist Court thus appears to
have been premature at best.
204. See Frazar v. Gilbert, 300 F.3d 530, 544 (5th Cir. 2002) ("Congress did not intend
that a court can require that a state participating in the Medicaid program must always provide
every EPSDT service to every eligible person at all times.").
205. See Frew v. Gilbert, 109 F. Supp. 2d 579, 598, 673 (E.D. Tex. 2000) (measuring
EPSDT program effectiveness in terms of performance rather than design).
206. Lapides v. Bd. of Regents, 535 U.S. 613 (2002).
207. Brief for Petitioners at 18-34, Frew ex rel. Frew v. Hawkins, 540 U.S. 431 (2004)
(No. 02-628).
208. See Frew, 540 U.S. at 436-37 ("We agree that the decree is enforceable under Ex
parte Young, and so we do not address the waiver argument."). One potential obstacle to the
waiver argument was that, unlike in Lapides, the State itself was no longer party to the suit. But
that distinction does not seem determinative. See Gunter v. Atl. Coast Line R.R. Co., 200 U.S.
273, 286 (1906) (finding that State, though not named party, waived its immunity by subjecting
its rights to determination via defendant State officials represented by State attomey general).
1034
SAVING SECTION 5
Lower courts have already begun to confirm the broad nature of the Frew
ruling. In JeffD. v. Kempthorne,20 9 a class of indigent minors diagnosed with
severe emotional and mental disabilities had entered into a consent decree with
State officials after alleging, inter alia, that they had been placed in State
facilities with known sexual predators in violation of their constitutional
rights.210 The consent decree (from 1983) required State officials, among other
things, to end placement of the minors with adults, to prepare a needs
assessment of children's mental health programs, and to provide facilities and
staff for various community-based mental health programs to serve those not
needing in-patient care.2 11 After a long history of compliance disputes and
supplements to the decree, the class brought an action in federal court to
enforce the decree. 2  The Ninth Circuit reaffirmed the continuing validity of
the decree under Firefighters and Rufo and rejected the State's Eleventh
Amendment defense by relying on Frew.213 Following the Supreme Court's
lead, the Ninth Circuit's analysis of whether the decree terms fell within the
scope of permissible relief under Young amounted to all of one sentence:
"[T]he relief embodied in the consent decrees is within the scope of Exparte
Young, as it entails prospective injunctive relief requiring compliance by state
officials." 21 4 Other federal courts of appeals have also approvingly cited Frew
in enforcing consent relief against State entities.21 5
D. Summary
Part II of this Article helps to establish a few key points: (1) Ex parte
Young doctrine is grounded in a longstanding fiction designed to circumvent
State sovereign immunity; (2) the scope of permissible Young relief,
notwithstanding a basic limitation on retroactive damages and a few recent
exceptions, has generally increased over time; (3) the outer bounds of
prospective injunctive relief in a Young suit seem to coincide with a district
209. Jeff D. v. Kempthome, 365 F.3d 844 (9th Cir. 2004).
210. Id. at 847.
211. Id. Interestingly, although the Ninth Circuit had previously invalidated portions of the
consent decree that were unrelated to remedies for the alleged substantive injuries, the Supreme
Court reinstated the decree as entered by the district court. Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717, 742-
43 (1986).
212. Kempthorne, 365 F.3d at 848-49.
213. Id. at851-54.
214. Id. at 854.
215. See, e.g., Barcia v. Sitkin, 367 F.3d 87, 102 (2d Cir. 2004) (enforcing consent decree
governing New York State Department of Labor's administrative hearing procedures).
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court's ordinarily broad equitable authority (that is, Eleventh Amendment
immunity does not seem to impose additional constraints on the scope of
prospective injunctive relief); and (4) despite recent limitations on traditional
equitable relief, consent decrees--even those involving State officials, as in the
Frew decree-remain a source of broad judicially sanctioned relief arising from
Young suits. The special category of Young-based consent decrees-with its
potentially expansive scope of State obligations designed to cure and prevent
possible federal law violations-holds the most promise as a vehicle for
comparing Section 5 authority and for revealing the tension in the Supreme
Court's jurisprudence.
III. The Narrowing Scope of Congress's Section 5 Power
Shifting gears from the Supreme Court's permissive treatment of the
consent decree in Frew, I turn to the Court's jurisprudence on the scope of
Congress's enforcement power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
A. Text and Early History
The starting point for Congress's Section 5 authority is the text of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment, in relevant
part, provides:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges
or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.2" 6
Section 5 then states:
The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the
provisions of this article.'
7
Thus, the issue is the scope of Congress's authority to "enforce" the terms
of Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment against State and local
governmental entities. Although I do not attempt an original historical analysis
or undertake a complete discussion of the original meaning of Section 5,218 it
216. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
217. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
218. For more thorough discussions of the historical understanding of Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment, see Ruth Colker, The Supreme Court's Historical Errors in City of
Boeme v. Flores, 43 B.C. L. REv. 783, 793-817 (2002); James W. Fox, Jr., Re-readings and
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would be helpful here briefly to describe the circumstances of the
Amendment's framing.
The Fourteenth Amendment, enacted in 1868 as part of the Reconstruction
Amendments, was designed to extend federal-law protection and to alter the
balance of State-federal power in the area of civil rights.219 The language of the
Amendment was revised from an earlier draft, which read: "The Congress shall
have power to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper to secure to
the citizens of each State all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several
States, and to all persons in the several States equal protection in the rights of
life, liberty, and property.
220
Whatever meaning can be discerned from the change, the framers do not
appear to have intended to give Congress unbridled substantive power through
Section 5.22 1 Although Section 1 sets forth its substantive commands in general
fashion, there is little support for the view that Congress was supposed to enjoy
free reign in determining what the protected rights-and thus the scope of its
enforcement authority-would be. For example, faced with charges that the
Amendment "would give Congress power to legislate about matters previously
reserved to the states and thereby result in a consolidation of power and the
destruction of the federal system as Americans had known it...
[p]roponents... made it clear that they did not intend such vast power for
Congress. 22 2 Similarly, during the drafting debates over the Civil Rights Act
of 1875, when opponents objected that early versions went beyond the
requirements of Section 1, no member of Congress responded that Section 5
provided the legislature plenary power to determine the substantive rights at
issue. Rather, supporters argued that the bill merely enforced rights already
established by the Fourteenth Amendment.223 Moreover, in the Civil Rights
Cases,224 the Court struck down part of the Civil Rights Act of 1875,
effectively rejecting Congress's attempt under the Fourteenth Amendment to
Misreadings: Slaughter-House, Privileges or Immunities, and Section Five Enforcement
Powers, 91 KY. L.J. 67, 91-108 (2002); Michael P. Zuckert, Congressional Power Under the
Fourteenth Amendment-The Original Understanding of Section Five, 3 CONsT. COMMENT. 123
(1986). See also Michael W. McConnell, Institutions and Interpretation: A Critique ofCity of
Boerne v. Flores, 111 HARV. L. REv. 153, 164 n.79 (1997) (collecting sources).
219. Exparte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 345-46 (1879).
220. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1034 (1866).
221. See McConnell, supra note 218, at 174-75 ("The supporters of the Fourteenth
Amendment never seriously entertained the 'substantive' interpretation of Section Five.").
222. WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: FROM POLITICAL PRINCIPLE TO
JUDICIAL DOCTRINE 114 (1988).
223. McConnell, supra note 218, at 175.
224. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
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prohibit private discrimination in public accommodations. 225 The Court relied
heavily on the "state action" requirement of Section 1.226 Although the case
does not necessarily mean Congress can never enforce Section 1 (which
227prohibits only state conduct) by regulating private conduct, it does indicate
some early understanding of limits on the scope of Section 5 authority.
However, it is still likely that Congress was understood at the time to
wield significant "interpretive" authority under Section 5. Professor McConnell
points to extensive congressional debates between 1866 and 1875 over the
substantive reach of the various Civil Rights Acts.228 Such debates, he argues,
would have been irrelevant unless Congress understood its role to be something
more than just an enforcer of the judicial interpretation of the Fourteenth
Amendment.229 Professor Kaczorowski also shows how the broad legislative
power exercised by the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment in enacting the
Civil Rights Act of 1866, as well as other antebellum legislation, suggests both
significant definitional and enforcement authority for Congress under Section
5.230
Even absent any interpretive role, the enforcement role was not limited to
the Court's construction of the bounds of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Professor Caminker reports that the debates on the analogous enforcement
clause of the Thirteenth Amendment "clearly indicate" the phrase "appropriate
legislation" was chosen with Chief Justice Marshall's especially deferential
standard from McCulloch v. Maryland2 3t in mind.232 Finally, the Supreme
Court in Exparte Virginia233-the first case interpreting the scope of Section 5
authority and thus indicative of its early understanding-used broad terms in
describing Congress's power:
225. See id. at 26 ("[I]t is clear that the law in question cannot be sustained by any grant of
legislative power made to Congress by the Fourteenth Amendment.").
226. See id. at 10-11 ("It is State action of a particular character that is prohibited.
Individual invasion of individual rights is not the subject-matter of the amendment.").
227. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 664-65 (2000) (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(proffering a narrower view of the precedential limitations of The Civil Rights Cases).
228. McConnell, supra note 218, at 176.
229. Id.
230. See Robert J. Kaczorowski, Congress 's Power To Enforce Fourteenth Amendment
Rights: Lessons from Federal Remedies the Framers Enacted, 42 HARv. J. ON LEGIs. 187,280-
83 (2005) ("The provisions of the Civil Rights Act demonstrate that the framers of the
Fourteenth Amendment exercised plenary power to define and enforce the civil rights of U.S.
citizens.").
231. McCullough v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819).
232. Evan H. Caminker, "Appropriate" Means-Ends Constraints on Section 5 Powers, 53
STAN. L. REV. 1127, 1159-65 (2001).
233. Exparte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1879).
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Whatever legislation is appropriate, that is, adapted to carry out the objects
the amendments have in view, whatever tends to enforce submission to the
prohibitions they contain, and to secure to all persons the enjoyment of
perfect equality of civil rights and the equal protection of the laws against
State denial or invasion, if not prohibited, is brought within the domain of
congressional power. 3
The Court emphatically distinguished the federal judicial power from
congressional power under the Fourteenth Amendment: "It is not said the
judicial power of the general government shall extend to enforcing the
prohibitions and to protecting the rights and immunities guaranteed.... It is the
power of Congress which has been enlarged[.] Congress is authorized to




B. Section 5 Jurisprudence in the Civil-Rights Era (1960s-1980s)
Brown v. Board of Education236 marked a sea change in anti-
discrimination law. As a result, the most important developments in Section 5
jurisprudence occurred during the modem civil-rights era. Two major pieces of
legislation help to frame this discussion: the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (1964
Act) and the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (1965 Act). The 1964 Act prohibited,
inter alia, racial discrimination in public accommodations.237  The
constitutional debates surrounding enactment of the 1964 Act centered upon
the issue of whether the statute should be enacted as an exercise of Section 5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment or the Commerce Clause.238 Congress chose to rely
on both. The Court first considered the validity of the 1964 Act in Heart of
Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States.239 The Court upheld the 1964 Act but
relied solely on the Commerce Clause, reserving judgment on whether it might
also be permissible under Section 5.240
234. Id. at 345-46.
235. Id. at 345.
236. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 345 U.S. 972 (1953).
237. See 1964 Act § 201, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (2000) (bearing section title "Prohibition
against discrimination or segregation in places of public accommodation").
238. Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Equal Protection by Law: Federal
Antidiscrimination Legislation After Morrison and Kimel, 110 YALE L.J. 441, 494 (2000)
[hereinafter Post & Siegel, Equal Protection].
239. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
240. See id. at 250 ("[S]ince the commerce power is sufficient for our decision here we
have considered it alone."). Two justices, however, expressed their view that the Court should
have also found the 1964 Act to be a valid exercise of Congress's Section 5 power. See id at
279-80 (Douglas, J., concurring) ("I would prefer to rest on the assertion of legislative power
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Although the Court never squarely addressed the extent of Section 5
authority to prohibit private discrimination during this period, it recognized a
robust role for Section 5. Concurring opinions by six Justices suggested that
Congress had the power to punish private actors who conspired to interfere
with Fourteenth Amendment rights.24' More important, outside the realm of
private discrimination (where the Court deemed that the Commerce Clause and
Section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment provided ample enforcement
authority242) the Court in Katzenbach v. Morgan243 asserted a broad
interpretation of Congress's Section 5 authority. As Professors Post and Siegel
observe, Morgan "advanced an institutionally differentiated approach to
Section 5" that, drawing upon the work of Archibald Cox, amounted to
"judicial review of Section 5 power in deferential terms resembling its approach
to federalism questions under the Commerce Clause.
244
. In Morgan, Section 4(e) of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, providing that
no person who has successfully completed sixth grade in a school in which the
predominant language is other than English shall be disqualified from voting
contained in § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment."); id. at 292-93 (Goldberg, J., concurring)
("[Iln my view, Congress clearly had authority under both § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment
and the Commerce Clause to enact the Civil Rights Act of 1964.").
241. See United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745,782 (1966) (Brennan, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) ("A majority of the members of the Court expresses the view today that
§ 5 empowers Congress to enact laws punishing all conspiracies to interfere with the exercise of
Fourteenth Amendment rights, whether or not state officers or others acting under the color of
state law are implicated in the conspiracy." (footnote omitted)). Nevertheless, the Court's
majority opinion expressly reserved the question. Id. at 755.
242. Post & Siegel, Equal Protection, supra note 238, at 501.
243. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
244. Post & Siegel, Equal Protection, supra note 238, at 500 & n.274 (citing Archibald
Cox, The Supreme Court, 1966 Term-Foreword: Constitutional Adjudication and the
Promotion of Human Rights, 80 HARv. L. REv. 91, 119 (1966)). Professors Post and Siegel
draw an analogy between Morgan's view of the Section 5 power and the Court's later
Thirteenth Amendment jurisprudence, in which Congress's enforcement power expanded much
more than the underlying self-enforcing, substantive provision. Id. at 495-96, 500; see also
Caminker, supra note 232, at 1131 (reaching similar conclusion). A similar analogy can be
drawn with the Fifteenth Amendment:
As against the reserved powers of the States, Congress may use any rational means
to effectuate the constitutional prohibition of racial discrimination in voting. The
basic test to be applied in a case involving § 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment is the
same as in all cases concerning the express powers of Congress with relation to the
reserved power of the States .... "Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the
scope of the constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly
adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit
of the constitution, are constitutional."
South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301,324 (1966) (emphasis added) (quoting McCulloch
v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819)).
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under any literacy test, was applied to prohibit enforcement of New York
election laws requiring the ability to read and write English as a voting
condition.245 The Court found that the 1965 Act, as applied, was a proper
exercise of Congress's Section 5 powers.
The Court first rejected the argument that Section 5 legislation can only be
sustained if the judicial branch determines that the prohibited state conduct is
also prohibited by the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment that Congress
sought to enforce. 246 The Court relied on Section 5's language, history, and
precedent, specifically quoting Exparte Virginia and its reliance on the broad
statement of congressional power in McCulloch v. Maryland.247 It reasoned
that the contrary position "would confine the legislative power in this context to
the insignificant role of abrogating only those state laws that the judicial branch
was prepared to adjudge unconstitutional, or of merely informing the judgment
of the judiciary by particularizing the 'majestic generalities' of Section 1 of the
Amendment. '" 248 Therefore, the fact that the Court had previously held that
English literacy requirements did not necessarily violate equal protection249 did
not render the statute outside Section 5 authority.
The Court then determined that Section 4(e) of the 1965 Act qualified as
"appropriate" legislation. The Court attributed to Congress the aim of securing
for the Puerto Rican community in New York nondiscriminatory treatment in
public services (such as schools and housing) and found Section 4(e)
sufficiently related to that aim.250 The Court said it was "not for us to review
the congressional resolution of [the] factors," including "the risk or
pervasiveness of the discrimination in governmental services" or "the adequacy
or availability of alternative remedies. 2 5 1 The Court made no reference to the
Congressional Record but for a single footnote. 5 2 The Court said it could
come to the same result by inquiring whether Section 4(e) was legislation
aimed at elimination of invidious discrimination in establishing voter
245. Morgan, 384 U.S. at 643-44.
246. See id. at 648 ("Neither the language nor history of § 5 supports such a
construction.").
247. Id. at 648-51.
248. Id. at 648-49.
249. See Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 50-54 (1959)
(sustaining North Carolina English literacy voting requirement against challenges based on
Fourteenth and Seventeenth Amendments).
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qualifications.253 In doing so, the Court came up with several hypothetical
rationales, concluding that "it is enough that we perceive a basis upon which
Congress might predicate a judgment that the application of New York's
English literacy requirement... constituted an invidious discrimination in
violation of the Equal Protection Clause.
254
Later during this period, the Court also invoked Section 5 to justify federal
affirmative action statutes. In Fullilove v. Klutznick,25 plaintiffs challenged on
Equal Protection grounds a congressional requirement that ten percent of
federal funds granted for local public works projects must be used by the local
grantee to purchase services from minority-owned businesses.256 The Supreme
257Court upheld the statute. Chief Justice Burger's plurality opinion
specifically relied on Congress's Section 5 power.258 According to the
plurality, although Congress had made no factual findings, Congress had before
it ample historical evidence "from which it could conclude that traditional
procurement practices, when applied to minority businesses, could perpetuate
the effects of prior discrimination., 259 In several subsequent cases through the
1980s, various members of the Court referred to congressional power under
Section 5 in opinions supporting federal affirmative action programs or
260invalidating state programs.
The Court addressed a separate but related question as to Section 5 power
and federalism implications in 1976: whether Congress could abrogate a
State's Eleventh Amendment immunity via Section 5 legislation. In Fitzpatrick
v. Bitzer, 26 1 the Court said yes, relying in part on language from Ex parte
253. Id. at 653-54.
254. Id. at 655-56.
255. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
256. Id. at 455.
257. Id. at 492.
258. Id. at 472.
259. Id. at 478.
260. See JOHN E. NowAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTIToIONAL LAw 1 10 n. 18 (7th
ed. 2004) (collecting cases and opinions). Indeed, in distinguishing Fullilove, Justice
O'Connor, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist-both of whom later adopted a much narrower
view of Section 5 authority-stated that:
Congress, unlike any State or political subdivision, has a specific
constitutional mandate to enforce the dictates of the Fourteenth
Amendment. The power to 'enforce' may at times also include the power
to define situations which Congress determines threaten principles of
equality and to adopt prophylactic rules to deal with those situations.
City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 490 (1989).
261. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
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Virginia that the Fourteenth Amendment was "intended to... [effect]
limitations of the power of the States and enlargements of the power of
Congress. '2 62  Although the Rehnquist Court-discussed next--denied
Congress's power to abrogate State sovereign immunity pursuant to its Article I
powers in Seminole Tribe, it reaffirmed Bitzer's recognition of a Section 5
abrogation power.263
C. Rehnquist Court Limitations (1990s-Present)
Although the prior sections provide context, the more critical issue for
purposes of this Article is the current state of the law on Congress's Section 5
authority. In 1995, the Court struck down a federal affirmative action program
as violating Equal Protection and applied the same level of (strict) scrutiny that
it applied to state programs.264 Thus, the Court backed away from its prior
indications that Section 5 imbued Congress with greater authority than States
when it came to remedying past discrimination via racial preferences. Then,
from 1997 to 2002, the Court decided six cases involving the scope of
Congress's Section 5 power and rejected the exercise of that power as overly
broad in all six cases. More important, the Court revamped the doctrine and
applied it in a manner that afforded relatively little discretion to Congress when
fashioning Section 5 enforcement legislation.
The story starts with City ofBoerne v. Flores.265 Congress enacted the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA) in direct response to
Employment Division, Department of Human Resources v. Smith,266 in which
the Supreme Court upheld against a free exercise challenge a neutral state law
of general applicability criminalizing peyote use as applied to Native American
Church members. In so ruling, the Court declined to apply the established
balancing test that first asked whether the law at issue substantially burdened a
religious practice and, if so, then asked whether the burden was justified by a
262. Id. at 454-56 (quoting Exparte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 345 (1879)).
263. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 59 (1996).
264. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200,227 (1995) ("[W]e hold today
that all racial classifications, imposed by whatever federal, state, or local governmental actor,
must be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny."); see also Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S.
489, 508 (1999) ("Congress has no affirmative power [under Section 5] to authorize the States
to violate the Fourteenth Amendment and is implicitly prohibited from passing legislation that
purports to validate any such violation.").
265. City of Boeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
266. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
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compelling government interest.267 RFRA, applicable to both the federal
government and the States, essentially sought to overrule Smith and codify the
prior balancing inquiry (with the gloss of a "least restrictive means" test).268
In Boerne, the Court held that RFRA exceeded the scope. of Congress's
Section 5 authority. The Court reasoned that Section 5 power "to enforce" is
only preventive or remedial, and that it is inconsistent with any suggestion that
Congress has the power to decree the substance of the Fourteenth
Amendment's restrictions on the States.269 The Court acknowledged that the
line between measures that remedy or prevent unconstitutional actions and
those that make a substantive change in the governing law is not easy to discern
and that Congress must have wide latitude in determining where it lies.27°
However, the Court stated, there must be a "congruence and proportionality"
between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that
end.27' Lacking such a connection, the Court instructed, legislation may
become substantive in operation and effect. 272 The Court also relied on the
principle of separation of powers, stating that the Fourteenth Amendment
273deprived Congress of any power to interpret and elaborate on its meaning.
Applying these principles, the Court found RFRA to be "so out of
proportion to a supposed remedial or preventive objective that it cannot be
understood as responsive to, or designed to prevent, unconstitutional
behavior."274 In addition to noting the lack of evidence in the legislative record
of widespread religious discrimination, the Court found RFRA to be overly
broad on a provision-by-provision basis. 275  It observed that RFRA's
restrictions applied to every government agency and official and to all statutory
or other law, whether adopted before or after its enactment; that RFRA had no
termination date or termination mechanism; and that RFRA added a demanding
"least restrictive means" test not used in even the pre-Smith jurisprudence.276
Based on the above, the Court concluded that RFRA constituted a sweeping
substantive change in constitutional protections as opposed to appropriate
enforcement legislation.
267. Id. at 883-89.
268. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 516-17.
269. Id. at 519.
270. Id. at 519-20.
271. Id. at 520.
272. Id. at 523-24.
273. Id.
274. Id. at 532.
275. Id. at 530-32.
276. Id. at 532-34.
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Although Boerne used some narrowing language, it did not in and of itself
necessarily signal a crippling blow to Congress's Section 5 authority. After all,
the facts in Boerne were especially egregious in terms of Congress expressly
seeking to redefine substantive constitutional law. Moreover, the holding did
277not engender much opposition from the more liberal justices. However, the
next five cases applying Boerne's "congruence and proportionality" test-all
decided by a 5-4 margin-have made clear that the Court has reduced
Congress's Section 5 authority in no small way:
(1) Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board v. College
Savings Bank.278 In Florida Prepaid, the Court held that the Patent and Plant
Variety Protection Remedy Clarification Act-abrogating the States' sovereign
immunity for patent infringement suits-was invalid because it was beyond the
scope of Congress's Section 5 authority to enforce the guarantees of the
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. Applying Boerne, the Court
stated that "for Congress to invoke § 5, it must identify conduct transgressing
the Fourteenth Amendment's substantive provisions, and must tailor its
legislative scheme to remedying or preventing such conduct."279 The Court
first found that Congress identified no pattern of unremedied patent
infringement by States (just eight suits in 110 years), let alone a pattern of due
process violations, as Congress barely considered the availability of
constitutionally adequate state remedies. 280 The Court further found, in light of
the lack of legislative support, that the Act's provisions-not limited to cases
involving intentional infringement or arguable constitutional violations but
applicable to all kinds of patent infringement and for an indefinite duration-
were too out of proportion to a remedial or preventive objective to be valid
Section 5 legislation.28'
(2) College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education
Expense Board:282 In College Savings Bank, issued along with Florida
Prepaid, the Court held that the Trademark Remedy Clarification Act-
subjecting States to federal court suit for false and misleading advertising-was
277. Justice Ginsburg joined the majority opinion. Justice Stevens also joined the majority,
but concurred on a separate theory. Justices Souter, Breyer, and O'Connor all dissented on
other grounds.
278. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627
(1999).
279. Id. at 639.
280. Id. at 640-44.
281. Id. at 647.
282. Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666
(1999).
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beyond the scope of Congress's Section 5 authority. The Court rejected the
argument that Congress acted to remedy and prevent due process violations
because neither of the asserted interests furthered by the Act-a right to be free
from a business competitor's false advertising or a right to be secure in one's
business interests-qualifies as a protected property right.283
(3) Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents:284 In Kimel, the Court held that
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA)-prohibiting
employment discrimination based on an individual's age and abrogating State
sovereign immunity-exceeded Congress's Section 5 authority. The Court
acknowledged that the Section 5 power "includes the authority both to remedy
and to deter violation of rights guaranteed thereunder by prohibiting a
somewhat broader swath of conduct, including that which is not itself forbidden
by the Amendment's text."285 However, the Court concluded that the Act failed
Boerne's "congruence and proportionality" test. It reviewed the Act's
legislative record and concluded that Congress had virtually no reason to
believe that State and local governments were unconstitutionally discriminating
against their employees on the basis of age.286 The Court found the substantive
requirements that the Act imposes on State and local governments
disproportionate to any unconstitutional conduct that the Act conceivably could
have targeted.287 The Court relied heavily on the fact that age is not a suspect
classification under the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause, and,
thus, States need not match age distinctions and legitimate interests they might
serve with great precision.288 Judged against the backdrop of the Equal
Protection Clause's rationality review, the Court found the Act's broad
restriction on the use of age as a discriminating factor to be too disproportionate
under Boerne because it prohibited substantially more State employment
decisions than would likely be held unconstitutional. 289 The Court rejected the
argument that the Act's "bona fide occupational qualification" defense--
permitting age classifications either if there is "a substantial basis for believing
that all or nearly all employees above an age lack the qualifications required
for the position" or if "it is highly impractical for the employer to insure by
283. Id. at 672-75.
284. Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000).
285. Id. at 81.
286. Id. at 89-91.
287. Id. at 83.
288. Id. at 84-85.
289. Id. at 86.
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individual testing that its employees will have the necessary qualifications for
the job"-sufficiently tailored the Act.
29 °
(4) United States v. Morrison:291 In Morrison, the Court held that 42
U.S.C. § 13981, part of the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA)--
providing a federal civil remedy for the victims of private gender-motivated
violence-exceeded Congress's Section 5 authority. The Court conceded that
the "voluminous" congressional record supported the contention that there is a
"pervasive" bias in various State justice systems against victims of gender-
motivated violence.292 Even assuming gender-based State discrimination,
however, the Court, relying on the early Civil Rights Cases, stated that the
Act's civil remedy provisions-directed not at State actors but at private
individuals who have committed criminal acts motivated by gender bias-were
not appropriate Section 5 remedies.293 The Court also critiqued the uniform,
nationwide nature of the remedies given that Congress's findings were limited
to just certain States.294
(5) Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett:295 In
Garrett, the Court held that Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA)-prohibiting employers from discriminating against qualified
individuals on the basis of disability and abrogating State sovereign
immunity-exceeded Congress's Section 5 authority. In applying Boerne's
"congruence and proportionality" test, the Court stated that the first step is to
identify with some precision the scope of the constitutional right at issue.296
The Court noted that the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause
afforded only a minimal rationality review to claims of disability
discrimination.297 Equal protection, the Court reasoned, does not require States
to make special accommodations for the disabled, so long as their treatment is
rational.298 The Court then found that the legislative record failed to identify a
pattern of irrational employment discrimination by States against the
disabled.299 The Court discounted instances of employment discrimination by
local governmental units as well as instances of State discrimination against the
290. Id. at 87-88 (quoting W. Air Lines, Inc. v. Criswell, 472 U.S. 400, 422-23 (1985)).
291. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
292. Id. at 619-20.
293. Id. at 625-26.
294. Id. at 626-27.
295. Bd. of Trs. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001).
296. Id. at 365.
297. Id. at 366 (citing City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985)).
298. Id. at 367.
299. Id. at 368-72.
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disabled in non-employment activities in the extensive record, explaining they
were irrelevant because the statute addressed only State discrimination in
employment.300 Finally, the Court concluded that the Act's remedial standards
went too far beyond the constitutional floor.30 1 For example, while the Court
found it entirely rational (and therefore constitutional) for a State employer to
conserve scarce financial resources by hiring employees able to use existing
facilities, the Act requires employers to make such facilities readily accessible
to and usable by disabled individuals.30 2 Even with the "undue hardship"
exception to the Act's "reasonable accommodation" requirement, the Court
found the accommodation duty to far exceed constitutional requirements.30 3
Despite this increasingly strict interpretation of Section 5 authority, the
Court has upheld Section 5 legislation in its two most recent decisions: Nevada
Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs3°4 and Tennessee v. Lane.305 In
Hibbs, the Court held that the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993-
entitling an employee to take up to twelve weeks of unpaid leave for the onset
of a serious illness in the family and abrogating State sovereign immunity-was
a valid exercise of Congress's Section 5 authority.3°6 In Lane, the Court held
that Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act-prohibiting exclusion of
individuals on the basis of disability from public services and abrogating State
sovereign immunity---constituted a valid exercise of Congress's Section 5
authority, as applied to the class of cases implicating the fundamental right of
access to the courts.
30 7
Nevertheless, the Court analyzed the remedial legislation in both cases
under the same "congruence and proportionality" rubric and by no means
discounted its prior post-Boerne line of cases. The Court distinguished Hibbs
based on the fact that gender-based claims get heightened scrutiny under the
Equal Protection Clause, thereby making it easier for Congress to establish a
sufficient record of unconstitutional discrimination and affording Congress
more leeway as to remedy.30 8 The Court limited Lane to the narrow class of
300. Id. at 369-71.
301. Id. at 372.
302. Id.
303. Id.
304. Nev. Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003).
305. Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004).
306. See Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 735 ("In sum, the States' record of unconstitutional
participation in, and fostering of, gender-based discrimination in the administration of leave
benefits is weighty enough to justify the enactment of prophylactic § 5 legislation.").
307. Lane, 541 U.S. at 533-34.
308. Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 735.
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cases involving the fundamental right of access to courts, hardly a broad grant
of authority to Congress. 309 These cases do not yet mark any fundamental shift
in the Court's approach to assessing the validity of Section 5 legislation.
IV. Analyzing the Tension: An Indefensible Inconsistency
The few scholars who have juxtaposed a district court's equitable
authority with Congress's Section 5 power have found no tension and, in fact,
have found a commendable consistency between the two bodies of
jurisprudence. 310 I disagree. My analysis here proceeds as follows: First, I
argue that the contexts--district court relief against States (including, more
specifically, consent decrees) and Section 5 legislation-are similar enough to
warrant critical comparison. Second, drawing upon Parts II and I, I show that
the Supreme Court has placed more exacting scrutiny on the exercise of
remedial power by Congress than by federal district courts, especially in the
consent decree context. Third, I argue that this disparate treatment is
misguided on several grounds and, accordingly, that the Supreme Court should
rethink its Section 5 framework.
A. Comparing Young-Based Consent Decrees with Section 5 Legislation
Before comparing the Supreme Court's treatment of district-court relief
(specifically consent decrees) ordered in response to alleged federal-law
violations by States with its treatment of Section 5 legislation promulgated in
response to federal-law violations by States, it is worth thinking more about
why the two contexts are similar enough to merit such comparison. For
starters, enforcement efforts by district courts and Congress alike often
involve detailed, complex measures requiring expert advice. Relief in both
contexts-Young-based suits and Section 5 legislation---can be prophylactic,
in that it can extend beyond the scope of the underlying federal law. As one
scholar has observed, such judicial decrees are "pro tanto legislative
309. Lane, 541 U.S. at 533-34. Moreover, Justice Scalia's dissent in Lane marks the
emergence of the narrowest view ever articulated by the Supreme Court as to the permissible
scope of Section 5 legislation. Essentially, Justice Scalia takes the position that Section 5's
command to Congress "to enforce" the rights of the Fourteenth Amendment literally means that
Congress can only punish conduct that would itself violate the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at
2008-10 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
310. See supra note 5 (describing previous scholarly work in area); infra note 352
(addressing argument that same limiting principles are at play in both equitable relief and
Section 5 cases).
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acts. 3 11 In addition, both contexts implicate important federalism-related
concerns: the State government is regulated and subjected to federal remedial
standards in either situation. Further, the underlying federal law in both
contexts is often terse and open-ended. For example, in Frew, the relevant
portions of the Medicaid statute constituted just a few paragraphs; similarly,
Section 5 legislation is based on Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment,
which speaks in few and relatively undefined words.
However, there are some important differences. I save discussion of those
differences that militate in favor of a broader scope for Section 5 relief for Part
IV.C. For now, I focus on two apparent differences that might lead one to think
that broad relief is justified only in the Young context but not with respect to
Section 5 legislation. First, a district court typically imposes Young relief only
after it has adjudicated a federal-law (often constitutional) violation.312 Second,
that relief is typically limited to the specific parties before the district court.
As to the first, the current Section 5 jurisprudence already requires-as a
sort of threshold step-that Congress have established a record of constitutional
violations in order to pass muster.3 13 Because the Court has increasingly held
that legislative record to adjudicative standards,31 4 Section 5 legislation often
follows congressional "adjudication" of such violations. Indeed, in Morrison,
the Court expressly assumed the existence of prior constitutional violations
based on the record of pervasive bias in the State judicial system against
victims of gender-motivated violence.31 5 More strikingly, once one considers
the consent decree context, whatever is left of the seeming distinction vanishes
completely. A district court can enter and enforce a consent decree against a
State simply based on the allegations in the complaint, without any trial or
formal court proceedings beyond a fairness hearing. Nor does the State have to
admit liability. For example, in Frew, the consent decree was entered and
311. Chayes, supra note 40, at 1297, 1302.
312. Cf Leonard, supra note 21, at 263 ("[T]he distinction between cases where the federal
violation is alleged and already proved is one of degree and not quality, but certainly the
interests of the national government in protecting its powers are exceptionally great once a
violation is proved.").
313. See Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 83-84 (2000) (imposing threshold
requirement in context of Age Discrimination in Employment Act); Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla.
Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 672 (1999) (imposing threshold
requirement in context of Trademark Remedy Clarification Act).
314. See Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Protecting the Constitution from the People:
Juricentric Restrictions on Section Five Power, 78 IND. L.J. 1, 11-17 (2003) (criticizing Court's
"judicialization" of congressional lawmaking).
315. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 619-20 (2000).
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enforced without any determination of federal-law violations.316 Therefore,
enforceable Young relief need not in fact be premised on any adjudicated
violation of federal law.
As to the second, at least in structural reform and class action cases (those
typically resulting in the broadest relief against State entities), a district court's
injunctive relief can affect a number of parties, even those not directly
responsible for the violations.3 17 For example, in prison reform suits, injunctive
relief can reach across entire statewide prison systems.318 Again, the consent
decree context further dilutes the distinction, as such relief is often sought on a
class-wide, statewide basis. As the State noted in Frew, a consent decree "can
reach far beyond the parties to the suit, significantly affecting a State's fisc,
available public services, and financial burdens on citizens through increased
taxes. 3 19 Therefore, Section 5 legislation-though perhaps of a somewhat
different degree-is not of a different kind.
One could argue, however, that my reliance on the consent decree
context--despite these added similarities-is misplaced: Consent decrees are a
different animal deserving uniquely broad deference because the parties
themselves (including the State) agree to the terms, thereby significantly
tempering any federalism concerns. This argument fails to recognize that a host
of federalism concerns persist with respect to consent relief.
First, intra-State separation of powers issues and the nature of institutional
reform can create a disconnect between the terms of a consent decree and a
State legislature's will. 320 The State entity consenting to the decree may not be
the same State entity whose autonomy is ultimately affected, raising
accountability and other federalism concerns. 32' For example, a bureaucratic
316. Frew ex rel. Frew v. Hawkins, 540 U.S. 431, 439-40 (2004).
317. See, e.g., Chayes, supra note 40, at 1284 ("[T]he trial judge has increasingly become
the creator and manger of complex forms of ongoing relief, which have widespread effects on
persons not before the court.").
318. See supra note 66 (collecting prison reform cases).
319. Respondents' Brief at 45, Frew ex rel. Frew v. Hawkins, 540 U.S. 431 (2004) (No.
02-628).
320. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Justice and Contract in Consent Judgments, 1987 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 19, 34 ("If prison officials believe their budget is too small, they may consent to a
judgment that requires larger prisons, and then take the judgment to the legislature to obtain the
funds.. . ."); Horowitz, supra note 40, 1294-95 ("Nominal [government official] defendants
are sometimes happy to be sued and happier still to lose."); Alan Effron, Note, Federalism and
Federal Consent Decrees Against State Governmental Entities, 88 CoLUM. L. REv. 1796, 1802
(1988) ("The consent of the state governmental entity to federal equitable relief does not
necessarily alleviate the federalism concerns associated with any of th[e] factors [associated
with other equitable injunctive relief].").
321. See, e.g., Effron, supra note 320, at 1805-06 (criticizing assumption "that the state
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executive branch official may want to bind his agency to. stringent terms to
force larger budget allocations by a more reluctant State legislature. Further,
one State official may be able to bind successor State officials to terms to which
they would not have agreed.
Second, even assuming a collective will, a State's initial consent is very
different than a State's voluntary compliance: the consent is typically obtained
under the duress of costly litigation. It is beyond belief that a State would
voluntarily choose to bind itself to extensive obligations absent the heavy-
handed threat of litigation and liability.
Third, the State cannot ordinarily back away from any of the terms for the
duration of the decree, as federal courts have the power of contempt to force
compliance.322 Under certain special circumstances, a State may be able to seek
modification of the terms of the decree, 23 but the power of modification is a
double-edged sword: a federal court also has the power under certain
circumstances to modify the decree over the objections of a signatory State,324
thereby further diluting its voluntary character. In any case, the State is often
subject to continuous and intrusive judicial supervision that frequently results
in further litigation.
325
Fourth, doctrinally speaking, the Supreme Court in Frew explicitly
avoided reliance on a "waiver" rationale despite the plaintiffs' argument that
the State had willingly agreed to the decree.326 The Court thus necessarily
entity consenting to the decree is identical to the one whose autonomy would thereby be
infringed").
322. See supra note 122 and accompanying text (stating and supporting proposition that
federal courts can use contempt citations to enforce consent decrees).
323. See supra note 121 and accompanying text (stating and supporting proposition that
federal courts can modify consent decrees).
324. See United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 391 U.S. 244,249 (1968) (permitting
modification of consent decree by plaintiff to strengthen terms of decree against defendants'
interests). Indeed, the United'Shoe Court applied a more relaxed standard for such modification
than the then-governing "grievous wrong" standard from Swift for defendants seeking to escape
the impact of consent decrees. See id. (holding that where "time and experience [had]
demonstrated" that the decree had failed, Swift did not preclude the trial court from modifying
the decree to achieve the decree's purposes). Lower courts have relied on United Shoe even
when the defendant signatory to the decree is a State entity. See, e.g., Holland v. N.J. Dep't of
Corr., 246 F.3d 267, 270 (3d Cir. 2001) (stating that "it is settled that a court does have inherent
power... to modify a decree," which includes "broad equitable power to fashion a remedy in its
exercise of its.., modification powers" and power "to extend the effective time period of a
consent decree").
325. See Effron, supra note 320, at 1807 ("Particularly in the context of institutional or
structural litigation, the entering of a consent decree all too often represents only a new
beginning of litigiousness.").
326. See Frew ex rel. Frew v. Hawkins, 540 U.S. 431, 436-37 (2004) ("[W]e do not
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assumed that the Eleventh Amendment bar applied and approved the broad
consent relief, notwithstanding constitutionally based State immunity concerns.
Indeed, consent decrees against States arguably present greater sovereignty
concerns than Section 5 legislation, since such legislation faces no Eleventh
Amendment bar. Alternatively, one could also argue that Congress's exercise
of Section 5 authority is not unlike a consent decree because the States have
already given their "consent" to Section 5 legislation through ratification of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
For these reasons, the fact that the State agrees to the terms of a consent
decree does not make such decrees inapt for present comparative purposes.
B. Comparing the Supreme Court's Approaches to the Different Contexts
Parts II and III lay out the doctrinal development of equitable judicial
relief (including consent decrees) against States and of Section 5 legislation,
respectively, and Part IV.A establishes a meaningful basis for comparing these
different modes of remedying violations of federal law. So what can be
concluded after comparing the different modes? There are three main
possibilities. First, for the reasons proffered but rejected in Part IV.A, the
Supreme Court might uniformly afford district courts under Young greater
discretion than Congress under Section 5. Second, the Supreme Court could
review Section 5 legislation in the same manner that it reviews a district court's
traditional injunctive order in a Young case. Third, the Supreme Court might
grant Congress the notably wider latitude that it grants a district court in
entering a consent decree against a State for federal-law violations. This
section seeks to reveal which scenario (as a descriptive matter) is the existing
state of the law, and the next section discusses which (as a constitutional and
normative matter) is the most justifiable approach.
The Supreme Court's "black letter" statements as to the permissible scope
of relief in the respective contexts are a good starting point. To recap briefly:
In traditional injunctive relief cases, the Court has said that-besides the Young
limitation on retrospective relief-"[o]nce a right and violation have been
shown, the scope of a district court's equitable powers to remedy past wrongs is
broad."327 This includes prophylactic measures.328 Although the scope of the
address the waiver argument.").
327. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15 (1971); Milliken 11,
433 U.S. at 281. See generally supra Part II.A.
328. Thomas, Prophylactic Remedy, supra note 5, at 302.
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remedy must be related to the scope of the harm,32 9 the Supreme Court's review
of whether the district court's relief is proper is only for abuse of discretion.330
With respect to consent decrees, the Court ultimately requires only that the
terms "further the objectives of the [federal] law upon which the complaint was
based," with or without adjudication of the alleged violation. 331 Beyond
limiting retrospective damages, it is unclear whether Young in any way narrows
the scope of enforceable consent decrees.332 In the Section 5 context, the Court
now first requires a prior record of constitutional violations.333 The Court also
requires that legislation be "congruent and proportional" to the injury to be
prevented or remedied.334 The Court states, however, that Congress can
prohibit "a somewhat broader swath of conduct" than what is forbidden by the
Fourteenth Amendment.335
The formulations of the traditional injunctive relief standard and the new
Section 5 standard seem relatively compatible, both requiring a degree of
tailoring between the injury and the relief, though equitable relief is subject
only to abuse of discretion review. The consent decree test, however, is far less
restrictive than both: the test essentially lacks any tailoring requirement. This
fairly lax approach is especially striking when juxtaposed with the Court's
approach to Section 5 legislation. Analysis of how the Court actually applies
the aforementioned standards on review makes clear that the Section 5 tailoring
requirement is the most stringent of all.
There are two related parts to the inquiry in all of these cases: (1) the
Court's determination/review of the scope of the federal-law violation (i.e., the
harm) and (2) the Court's own tailoring analysis (i.e., the fit between harm and
relief). As to the first part, the Supreme Court has largely stayed true to the
"abuse of discretion" standard of review in Young cases with respect to a
district court's assessment of the scope of the harm or alleged federal-law
violation to be redressed. Before reviewing the scope of a Young remedial
order, the Court rarely questions whether the district court correctly adjudicated
329. See Milliken 11, 433 U.S. at 281-82 (explaining "[tihe well-settled principle that the
nature and scope of the remedy are to be determined by the violation").
330. See, e.g., Spallone v. United States, 493 U.S. 265,274 (1990) (concluding that lower
court's imposition of contempt sanctions was abuse of discretion).
331. Local No. 93, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 525
(1986).
332. See supra Part II.C (discussing Court's analysis in Frew).
333. E.g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 530 (1997).
334. Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 81-82 (2000).
335. Id. at 81.
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the extent of the underlying violation, if one has even been adjudicated at all.336
The Court is especially deferential with respect to consent decrees, permitting
such decrees as long as there is an allegation of a related federal-law
violation.337
However, the Court has not been so deferential in its review of the basis
for Section 5 legislation, effectively subjecting Congress to de novo review. In
the Section 5 context, the Court reviews the legislative record of past violations
much like an intermediate appellate court reviewing a lower court record. For
example, in Garrett, the Court culled through the extensive Congressional
record as well as Justice Breyer's thirty-nine-page appendix relating to
legislative findings of past discrimination against the disabled. 338 The Court
then came to its independent conclusion that the record was inadequate because
the evidence did not prove sufficient irrational discrimination (as opposed to
just disparate impact) in the workplace (as opposed to other contexts) by State
entities (as opposed to local governmental units).339 In coming to that
conclusion, the Court seemingly paid no deference to Congress's initial
assessment that there was sufficient illegal discrimination against the disabled
to justify the ADA.
As to application of the tailoring requirement, the difference between the
contexts is even starker. For Section 5 legislation-even if the Court
determines there is a sufficient record of constitutional violations after its de
novo review of the legislative record34° -the Court's tailoring ("congruence and
proportionality") analysis is rigorous. The Court routinely parses the legislation
at issue and compares it, on a provision-by-provision basis, with the judicial
standard for the underlying constitutional right that Congress sought to protect.
For example, in Florida Prepaid, the Court concluded that the patent
legislation strayed too far beyond due process standards because the act would
also apply to unintentional violations and cases where alternate State remedies
might be available. 34' The Court did not try to assess what percentage of State
336. This deference could be attributed to several reasons depending on the case: the
Supreme Court might not want to wade into the factual complexities of the liability
determination (given its time and other limitations as an appellate court of last resort) or, as a
practical matter, the "liability" part of the case may already be final. In any event, the Court
rarely reexamines the liability part of the case despite its relation to the remedial inquiry.
337. Local No. 93, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 522-23
(1986).
338. Bd. ofTrs. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 369-71 (2001).
339. Id.
340. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 619-20 (2000) (assuming
unconstitutional discrimination in State's treatment of victims of gender-motivated violence).
341. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627,643
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violations had been unintentional (the one at issue in Florida Prepaid itself
certainly was not). Nor did the Court defer to Congress's reasonable
assumption that, in light of the history of federal law enforcement in this area,
state-law remedies were inadequate to remedy State infringements.342 Based on
its own inquiry, the Court concluded that the means-end fit was constitutionally
inadequate.
Likewise, in Kimel, the Court scrutinized the provisions of the ADEA in
light of the Court's rational basis standard for age discrimination claims. The
Court found that the statutory standard prohibiting employment discrimination
based on an individual's age stretched too far beyond the goal of stopping
unconstitutional or irrational age discrimination.343 The Court carefully
considered the ADEA's "bona fide occupational qualification" defense, but
found the defense-notwithstanding its narrowing effect-insufficiently
tailored for Section 5 purposes.3" In Garrett, which had a much more
extensive legislative record of discrimination than did Kimel, the Court
similarly embarked on a close comparison of Title I of the ADA to the judicial
rational-basis standard for disability discrimination. It found the ADA's
"reasonable accommodation" requirement inadequately tailored to the goal of
preventing unconstitutional State discrimination against the disabled in
employment. The Court evaluated but rejected as insufficient the narrowing
effect of the ADA's "undue hardship" exception.345 Some have observed-
accurately in my view-that the Court's review of Section 5 legislation in these
cases amounts to "strict scrutiny.
34
In sharp contrast, when presented with the enforceability of broad judicial
relief against a State in Frew, the Court effectively refrained from any tailoring
analysis. The Court concluded-in all of one paragraph-that the consent
decree constituted "a remedy consistent with Ex parte Young and
Firefighters.3 47 As chronicled in detail supra Part II.C, there were plenty of
opportunities for the Court to comment on the "fit" between the decree and the
Medicaid statute. Nevertheless, the Court limited itself to a single cursory
example of the relationship between the decree terms and the federal-law
(1999).
342. Id. at 649 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
343. Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 91 (2000).
344. Id. at64.
345. Bd. of Trs. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 372 (2001).
346. Id. at 387 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Post & Siegel, Equal Protection, supra note
238, at 477).
347. Frew ex rel. Frew v. Hawkins, 540 U.S. 431,439 (2004).
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mandate. 348 State sovereignty concerns were relegated to the possibility of
future modification of the decree at the district court's discretion under the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.349  Although the Court may be more
concerned with tailoring of district court injunctive relief now than in the
past,350 that concern has not spilled over to consent decrees. Indeed, the Court
has consistently rejected arguments that a district court has exceeded its
authority in entering or enforcing a consent decree against State or other
governmental entities.
351
C. Why the Court Needs to Harmonize Its Section 5 Jurisprudence
The above comparison of the Court's approach to the different remedial
contexts shows that judicial prophylactic relief against a State entity-
especially in a consent decree-is, in many significant ways, afforded greater
leeway than Section 5 prophylactic legislation.352 But is this how things should
be?
Before proceeding, let me make clear that I do not advocate decreasing the
remedial discretion afforded federal district courts to achieve greater
348. See supra note 159 and accompanying text (quoting Justice Kennedy's example).
349. Supra note 153 and accompanying text; cf Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail,
502 U.S. 367, 384-91 (1992) (rejecting higher "grievous wrong" standard for modification of
consent decrees in institutional reform context in favor of more flexible standard under Rule
60(b)(5), but still requiring that party seeking modification bear burden of establishing that
significant change in facts or law warrants revision of decree and that proposed modification is
suitably tailored to changed circumstances).
350. See supra Part II.A.3 (describing Rehnquist Court incursions on federal courts'
Section 5 authority).
351. See Frew, 540 U.S. at 437-42 ("Enforcing the agreement does not violate the
Eleventh Amendment."); Local No. 93, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S.
501, 525 (1986) (enforcing consent decree entered in employment discrimination case against
city).
352. Professor Thomas, who has considered the two general contexts under a single
remedial rubric, finds the same limiting principles at play in both equitable relief and Section 5
cases. Thomas, Prophylactic Remedy, supra note 5, at 335-39, 349-52; Thomas, Remedial
Rights, supra note 5, at 724-39. I agree that that the contexts are similar and that, at least to a
certain extent, similar principles should apply. I would even agree that Supreme Court doctrine
purports to apply similar principles in the two contexts. But Professor Thomas fails to consider
consent decrees, which, in many ways, have more in common with Section 5 legislation than
does traditional equitable judicial relief. Based on the above analysis, I cannot agree that the
Supreme Court's actual application of the limits in the Section 5 context has been at all
consistent with limits on all equitable relief Especially when viewed through the unique lens of
the consent decree cases-most recently Frew--I think it becomes clear that the Court keeps
Congress on a much shorter leash than it does federal district courts.
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consistency.353 As established in Part II, such discretion is well justified as a
matter of established legal tradition and precedent. Frew demonstrates the
continued vitality of that tradition, at least in the consent decree context. All
nine justices agreed that the extensive decree at issue in Frew was consistent
with both Firefighters and Ex parte Young, and thus constituted proper,
judicially enforceable relief.354 Broad equitable discretion is also well justified
as a matter of sound legal policy. A federal judge-armed with intimate factual
knowledge of the dispute and the conduct of the parties-should have the
flexibility necessary to shape effective relief. Such flexibility is especially
necessary in more complex litigation involving institutional-type reform.
355
Moreover, in the consent decree context, parties are much more likely to reach
settlement and avoid costly litigation if permitted to enter into flexible yet
judicially enforceable decrees.356  Thus, rather than limit broad judicial
equitable relief, this Article proposes broadening Section 5 authority based on
the existing scope of consent relief.
357
353. Much as there are two ways to cure an equal protection violation-extend the benefit
previously denied to the discriminated group or simply deny the benefit to all groups--there are
two ways to alleviate the anomaly that district courts receive greater discretion than Congress in
remedying federal law violations: increase congressional authority or decrease district court
authority. In both situations, I think the first alternatives are generally the preferred solutions.
354. Frew, 540 U.S. at 438-39.
355. See, e.g., Chayes, supra note 40, at 1308 ("The solutions can be tailored to the needs
of the particular situation and flexibly administered or modified as experience develops with the
regime established in the particular case."); Thomas, Prophylactic Remedy, supra note 5, at 332
& n. 134 ("Professors Fiss and Chayes argued that untailored prophylactic remedies were needed
to provide the courts with the necessary flexibility to achieve social justice in public law
cases.").
356. See, e.g., Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 381 (1992)
(observing that long duration and public impact of institutional-reform consent decrees
necessitate flexibility).
357. Although I am the only one to use the present comparative framework to make the
point, several other legal scholars agree that the Supreme Court has overly constricted
Congress's Section 5 authority. See JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., NARROWING THE NATION'S POWER:
THE SUPREME COURT SIDES WITH THE STATES 148 (2002) (asking "why Congress should be
confined to the remedial. The Fourteenth Amendment assigns Congress the role of enforcing its
guarantees. The amendment assigns no role to the court."); Caminker, supra note 232, at 1131
(arguing that Section 5 power should be interpreted according to rational basis test applied to
ordinary Article I legislation); Samuel Estreicher & Margaret H. Lemos, The Section 5
Mystique, Morrison, and the Future of Federal Antidiscrimination Law, 2000 SuP. CT. REV.
109, 134 n. 105 (rejecting argument that "Congress's power should be adjudged by the same
standards that govern the ability of lower courts to fashion remedies for constitutional or
statutory violations"); McConnell, supra note 218, at 156 ("My thesis is that when Congress
interprets the provisions of the Bill of Rights for purposes of carrying out its enforcement
authority under Section Five, it is not bound by the institutional constraints that in many cases
lead the courts to adopt a less intrusive interpretation from among the textually and historically
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There are several reasons-in addition to doctrinal and jurisprudential
consistency-why Congress acting under Section 5 should be given the same
wide latitude to regulate State entities as a federal district judge entering a
consent decree against a State.358 They are grouped as follows: (1) text,
(2) institutional capacity, (3) democratic legitimacy, and (4) safeguards of the
political process.
1. Text
The text of the Constitution supports greater authority for Congress to
regulate States in a remedial capacity than for federal courts to do so. A good
starting point-especially when appealing to the current Court-is the Eleventh
Amendment. The Eleventh Amendment states that "[t]he Judicial power of the
United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity,
commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of
another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State. 359 The Eleventh
Amendment, embodying the principle of State sovereign immunity, supports a
narrow reading of Article III and places express constitutional limits on federal
judicial power with respect to States. The Eleventh Amendment has been
construed not only to limit diversity suits against States, but also federal
question suits.360 Moreover, the Supreme Court has held that the Eleventh
Amendment prevents Congress from granting federal courts jurisdiction to
enforce Article I legislation against the States.36 '
plausible meanings of the clause in question."); Post & Siegel, Equal Protection, supra note
238, at 444 ("We argue that neither separation-of-powers nor federalism values require the kind
of stringent judicial supervision of Section 5 antidiscrimination legislation that some
interpretations of the Court's recent decisions might be read to authorize.").
358. Not everyone agrees. For example, Professors Hamilton and Schoenbrod, in
defending the recent line of Section 5 cases, seek to justify a narrower role for Congress under
Section 5. They argue that:
The Supreme Court should not give Congress more latitude in determining whether
it has exceeded its remedial power under Section 5 than the Court grants lower
courts in determining whether they have exceeded their remedial power.... Indeed,
there are reasons to suppose that Congress, in formulating legislative remedies
under Section 5, should be held to a higher standard ofjustification than are trial
court judges in formulating judicial remedies.
Hamilton & Schoenbrod, supra note 5, at 486. The following reasons demonstrate why, in my
view, their position is untenable.
359. U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
360. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44,54 (1996).
361. Id. at 72-73.
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Despite these limits, the Court recognizes a powerful exception to State
sovereign immunity through the Exparte Young doctrine. As discussed in Part II,
Young affords federal courts subject matter jurisdiction with broad equitable
authority to coerce States to comply with federal law. Young-deemed a "fiction"
by the very Court that sustains it362-even allows federal district courts to enforce
not only the federal Constitution but also federal statutes.363 There is an obvious
tension between the otherwise stringent limits on judicial power imposed by the
Eleventh Amendment and the broad non-constitutional exception afforded district
courts to enforce federal law against the States.
364
Although I am not arguing that Young doctrine should be circumscribed36 5-it
serves too important a purpose--the fact Section 5 authority trumps Eleventh
Amendment immunity is noteworthy.366 In contrast to the Court-manufactured
Young exception, Section 5 gives Congress an explicit textual command "to
enforce" the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment against the States, and thus
does not confront any such constitutional impediment.
Further, as several scholars have argued persuasively, Section 5's mandate-in
light of the open-ended language of Section 1, the nature of the congressional
debates on the early Civil Rights Acts, and the historical dialogue between the
Supreme Court and Congress with respect to the scope of anti-discrimination
legislation--may also afford Congress some role in interpreting the substantive
scope of Fourteenth Amendment guarantees.367 One scholar has noted: "In the
362. Pennhurst State Sch. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 105 (1984).
363. See, e.g., Frew ex rel. Frew v. Hawkins, 540 U.S. 431, 436-40 (2004) (enforcing
federal Medicaid Act); Bd. of Trs. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 374 n.9 (2001) ("Title I of the
ADA... can be enforced... by private individuals in actions for injunctive relief under Ex
parte Young.").
364. See Laura S. Fitzgerald, Beyond Marbury: Jurisdictional Self-Dealing in Seminole
Tribe, 52 VAND. L. REv. 407, 410-13 (1999) (arguing that nowhere does Court explain how
Article III (as interpreted through Eleventh Amendment) could provide such stringent limits on
Congress's power to grant subject matter jurisdiction in lawsuits alleging federal-law violations
by States, while leaving intact Court's own power to do so under Ex parte Young); Leonard,
supra note 21, at 325 (noting contradiction between increase in State sovereign immunity and
Ex parte Young under the Rehnquist Court).
365. See supra notes 353-57 and accompanying text (reviewing advantages of using
injunctive relief and consent decreesto resolve disputes).
366. See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445,454-56 (1976) ("[W]e think that the Eleventh
Amendment, and the principle of state sovereignty which it embodies, are necessarily limited by
the enforcement provisions of§ 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment." (citation omitted)); Seminole
Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 65-66 (1996) (reaffirming principle that Section 5 power trumps
State sovereign immunity).
367. See Colker, supra note 218, at 817-18; McConnell, supra note 218, at 172,176; Post
& Siegel, Equal Protection, supra note 238, at 446. I will not repeat here the well-reasoned
support provided in those articles.
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face of this 'textually demonstrable constitutional commitment... to a
coordinate... branch ofgovernment,' the courts should be hesitant to second-guess
congressional determinations about the scope of enumerated rights.
368
Recognizing such an interpretive role for Congress would necessarily increase the
scope of Section 5 power, because Congress would, to some extent, be defining the
very rights it simultaneously was seeking to protect through remedial legislation.36 9
But even if one does not read the relevant text or history to permit an
interpretive role, Congress still has broad enforcement discretion by Section 5's own
terms. Indeed, the Section 5 enforcement command is limited only by the condition
that Congress act through "appropriate" legislation. As Professor McConnell has
observed, the term "appropriate" has its origins in the "latitudinarian construction"
of congressional power in McCulloch v. Maryland.370 He argues that the "framers'
use of this term suggests an awareness that the question whether legislation serves to
'enforce' the [Fourteenth] Amendment is not clear-cut, and an intention on their part
to allow Congress considerable discretion. 37' This view is consistent with the
Court's view in Morgan (now largely abandoned) that Section 5 "is a positive grant
of legislative power authorizing Congress to exercise its discretion in determining
whether and what legislation is needed to secure the guarantees of the Fourteenth
Amendment."
372
In sum, in light of the fact that State sovereign immunity poses no obstacle, the
fact that Congress has a clear constitutional mandate "to enforce" the Fourteenth
Amendment (which may or may not include some interpretive power), and the fact
that such enforcement need only be by "appropriate" legislation, Congress acting
pursuant to Section 5 should have greater remedial authority against States than
federal district courts mandating traditional equitable relief under Young--perhaps
authority more akin to the consent relief context.
2. Institutional Capacity
Congress's special role is buttressed by functional institutional considerations.
Congress-at least for bigger, less localized problems--is likely better equipped
368. McConnell, supra note 218, at 188 (alterations in original) (footnote omitted)
(quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962)).
369. Cf Mishkin, supra note 40, at 955-60 (noting fluidity in institutional reform cases
between right and remedy).
370. McConnell, supra note 218, at 188; see also Caninker, supra note 232 passim
(suggesting that McCulloch conception of congressional power be applied to Section 5
legislation).
371. McConnell, supra note 218, at 188.
372. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 (1966).
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than district courts to gather the facts necessary to justify a prophylactic remedy.373
The type of facts that are most relevant to the policy assessments essential in
properly identifying systemic problems and developing prophylactic solutions are
better classified as "legislative" facts.374 Congress exercises its fact-finding powers
in a manner different than a court; after all, Congress is not an adjudicative body
that creates trial-type records. In addition to being free of constraints such as
evidentiary rules and a record created by interested litigants, Congress has greater
investigatory resources to cast a wider net. Moreover, Congress is not bound by the
institutional restraint that courts show when evaluating more democratic bodies.
If Congress, based on its superior fact-finding powers,375 comes to the
conclusion that a prophylactic remedy is necessary, why should the Court disturb
that conclusion? Certainly, the Court should be more reluctant to disturb that
373. Even the Chief Justice himself, who holds Congress to adjudicatory standards when it
comes to sufficiency of evidence in the recent Section 5 cases, has in other contexts recognized
the importance of deference to the legislature-given its unique capabilities-with respect to its
investigatory methods and related conclusions:
The Court's criticism of the statistics relied on by the District Court conveys the
impression that a legislature in enacting a new law is to be subjected to the judicial
equivalent of a doctoral examination in statistics. Legislatures are not held to any
rules of evidence such as those which may govern courts or other administrative
bodies, and are entitled to draw factual conclusions on the basis of the
determination of probable cause which an arrest by a police officer normally
represents.
Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 224 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
374. As originally defined by Professor Davis, "legislative facts"-distinguished from
"adjudicative facts" relating to the details of a particular case-are those facts that "inform[] a
court's legislative judgment on questions of law and policy." Kenneth Culp Davis, An
Approach to Problems of Evidence in the Administrative Process, 55 HARv. L. REv. 364, 402,
404 (1942); see also Kenneth Culp Davis, Facts in Lawmaking, 80 COLUM. L. REv. 931, 931
(1980) [hereinafter Davis, Facts in Lawmaking] (referring to legislative facts as those used in
lawmaking, broadly defined to include legislative enactments, judicial decisions, and
administrative regulation).
375. Substantial academic literature as well as judicial precedent supports the view that
Congress is better than courts at determining legislative facts. See, e.g., Turner Broad. Sys., Inc.
v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 195 (1997) ("We owe Congress's findings deference in part because the
institution is far better equipped than the judiciary to amass and evaluate the vast amounts of
data bearing upon legislative questions." (quotations omitted)); Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497
U.S. 547, 572 (1990) ("The 'special attribute [of Congress] as a legislative body lies in its
broader mission to investigate and consider all facts and opinions that may be relevant to the
resolution of an issue."' (alteration in original) (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448,
502-03 (1980) (Powell, J., concurring)); Davis, Facts in Lawmaking, supra note 374, at 941
(noting limitations of trial courts in finding legislative facts); Neal Devins, Congressional
Factfinding and the Scope of Judicial Review: A Preliminary Analysis, 50 DUKE L.J. 1169,
1169-70 & n.4 (2001) (collecting cases); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Rediscovering a Principled
Commerce Power, 28 PEPP. L. REv. 589, 590 (2001) ("Congress is a better fact finder.").
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conclusion than one reached by a less able district court.37 Indeed, this is the
logic behind the principle of separation of powers, applied in its basic
functional sense. In short, Congress has a greater capacity to identify the facts
amounting to constitutional violations, and Congress thus deserves greater
deference as to that threshold issue.
As Professors Post and Siegel have observed, the Supreme Court has
misguidedly applied a very court-centric view of equal protection to Congress
in the Section 5 context.377 At its heart, the Equal Protection Clause is
concerned with invidious discrimination.378 But:
[T]here is a significant gap between conduct that will be found
unconstitutional under standards and procedures that courts have devised
for use in adjudicatory proceedings, and conduct that might be found
unconstitutional by a factfinder applying judicial standards but not subject
to the same institutional constraints as courts. Because the considerations
of "judicial restraint" that shape and guide rational basis review are
specifically designed to prevent courts from intruding on legislative
discretion, they ought not to prevent Congress from applying the
prohibition against invidious discrimination in a procedurally different and
more comprehensive way than a court.
379
In other words, the Supreme Court should not hold Congress's
determinations of what constitutes unconstitutional discrimination to court-
constructed tests such as rational basis scrutiny. There is no justification for
imposing on Congress ajudicial framework that has led to "underenforcement
of the equal protection clause by the federal courts.
380
In addition to its institutional advantages over courts when it comes to
detecting violations, Congress is also in a better position than courts when it
376. Although they agree with the premise, Professors Hamilton and Schoenbrod come to
the opposite conclusion-that is, Congress's greater capacity to gather relevant facts and to
reach factual conclusions needed to justify a prophylactic remedy militates in favor of a more
stringent, Court-enforced proportionality requirement in Section 5 cases (and thus less
congressional latitude). See Hamilton & Schoenbrod, supra note 5, at 486 ("Indeed, there are
reasons to suppose that Congress, in formulating legislative remedies under Section 5, should be
held to a higher standard of justification than are trial court judges in formulating judicial
remedies."). Their reasoning seems exactly backwards: should not the better-situated actor be
afforded greater discretion?
377. Post & Siegel, Equal Protection, supra note 238, at 459-73; cf McConnell, supra
note 218, at 156, 185-89 (making similar argument, based on Congress's greater democratic
legitimacy, that Congress should be able to choose broader test than Supreme Court as to scope
of Free Exercise authority).
378. Post & Siegel, Equal Protection, supra note 238, at 462-63.
379. ld. at 467.
380. Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced
Constitutional Norms, 91 HARv. L. REv. 1212, 1218 (1978).
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comes to devising remedial standards. A single federal judge--even when
enacting consent relief largely fashioned by the litigants or a court-appointed
expert-has limited resources to contemplate and develop the type of broad,
structural relief required in complex cases.38' While this problem is mitigated
in the consent decree context because the parties themselves help to devise
the remedy, the district court is largely rendered a passive participant because
even the underlying facts on which the remedy is based may never have been
adjudicated. In contrast, Congress will spend years developing Section 5
legislation based on committee reports and extensive hearings involving
interested parties and experts. Although somewhat ironic given the Supreme
Court's Eleventh Amendment holding in the case, perhaps it is not surprising
that the Court in Seminole Tribe relied on deference to the congressionally
crafted remedial scheme at issue in denying the availability of judicially-
implied remedies under Ex parte Young doctrine.38 2
3. Democratic Legitimacy
A distinct but related separation-of-powers concern arises from the
perception that a district court, in issuing broad remedial decrees, is engaging
in policymaking and thus usurping the legislature's designated role in
policymaking through a democratic forum. Apart from the aforementioned
concerns of institutional capacity and expertise, some object to broad decrees
as exceeding both prudential (and perhaps also Article III) limits due to their
legislative character and the fact that such decisions impose such extensive
costs and burdens. Such changes, they argue, should instead flow through
the legislative process to ensure democratic legitimacy.383 Congress certainly
is not subject to any such separation of powers criticisms. Congress, after all,
is the consummate democratic policymaking body in our system of
government.
381. See Horowitz, supra note 40, at 1288, 1297, 1303-04 ("The courts have a
comparative advantage when it comes to adjudicating rights; they have none when it comes to
enforcing complex remedies.").
382. See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44,74 (1996) (concluding that enactment of
complex remedial scheme demonstrated Congress's intent to preclude state law remedies).
383. See Thomas, Prophylactic Remedy, supra note 5, at 304 n. 12 (collecting sources of
criticism); see also Ross SANDLER & DAVID SCHOENBROD, DEMOCRACY BY DECREE: WHAT
HAPPENS WHEN COURTS RuN GOVERNMENT 12, 223-28 (2003) (critiquing the anti-democratic
nature of structural reform-including consent-decrees issued by courts).
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4. Safeguards of the Political Process
Another argument against the status quo of lesser congressional deference
relies on the federalism safeguards of the political process: States are adequately
protected through the political process in Congress from unnecessarily intrusive
legislation.384 Because members of Congress ultimately represent constituents of
their respective States, they will not agree to legislation that unnecessarily
impinges on the sovereignty of their respective States.385 Moreover, since most
modem Section 5 legislation applies on a nationwide basis, there is little danger
that the legislation would burden only a certain group of minority States that
could not effectively block it. Although this concept has been developed most in
arguing for restrained judicial review of Congress's Article I powers, the same
logic applies in the Section 5 context. As Professor Choper has written:
These considerations strongly support the Court's [prior] position which
afford[ed] Congress extensive flexibility to define constitutional liberty under
the enforcement clauses [such as Section 5]-a much more spacious latitude
than the Court itself assumes in reviewing state (and private) action under § 1
of [the Fourteenth A]mendment[] unaided by congressional legislation. [With
respect to the exercise of Congress's Section 5 authority], there should be no
judicial review at all.386
Therefore, federalism concerns simply do not resonate in the Section 5 context to
anywhere near the same degree that they do for comparable judicial relief.
V Remedying the Tension: Frew as a Model for Section 5 Review
For all the reasons discussed above, Congress acting under Section 5 merits
at least the discretion accorded a federal district judge acting under Young in
384. JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLMCAL PROCESS 171-259
(1980); Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in
the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543, 543
(1954).
385. See CHOPER, supra note 384, at 176-79 (explaining in detail mechanism by which
congressional influence protects States); Weschler, supra note 384, at 546 (explaining States'
power to negate proposed legislation through their congressional representatives).
386. CHOPER, supra note 384, at 199-200. I only mean to present the basic argument here,
as there is substantial academic literature both supporting and critiquing the political process
theory and exploring its nuances. See, e.g., Saikrishna B. Prakash & John C. Yoo, The Puzzling
Persistence of Process-Based Federalism Theories, 79 TEX. L. REv. 1459 passim (2001)
(critiquing the position). Even if one does not subscribe to the stronger formulation of
abdicating all judicial review in such cases, as Professor Choper proposes, the argument
provides at least some support for judicial restraint in review of Section 5 legislation.
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fashioning prophylactic relief to prevent and remedy federal-law violations. But
under what standard then should the Supreme Court review Section 5 legislation?
Fortunately, the consent decree context not only helps illustrate the problem with
the Court's Section 5 jurisprudence but also suggests a solution.
Although my goal in this Article is not to develop fully an alternate
framework, the Court's recent decision in Frew may provide the contours for a
new mode of analysis in Section 5 cases. To remind the reader, the Court in
Frew did little more than apply the traditional Firefighters test to determine the
enforceability of a consent decree against the State. In other words, the Court
merely asked whether the detailed, eighty-page decree "resolve[d] a dispute
within the court's subject-matter jurisdiction," "c[a]me within the general scope
of the case made by the pleadings," and "further[ed] the objectives of the law
upon which the complaint was based. 3 87 With little further analysis, the Court
found the relief to be consistent with both Firefighters and Young, and deemed
the decree enforceable notwithstanding the Eleventh Amendment.388
Applying Frew's inquiry to Section 5 legislation, the Court could simply
ask whether the legislation "furthered the objectives" of the underlying
Fourteenth Amendment right sought to be enforced ("the law upon which the
complaint was based") and "came within the general scope of the" legislative
record ("the case made by the pleadings"). Much like Professor Caminker's
suggested means-end test modeled on the "rational relationship" inquiry
established by McCulloch v. Maryland,389 the approach in Frew-when applied
to Section 5 legislation-would afford Congress an appropriate level of
discretion and provide the Court a mode of review with which it is already
familiar.
Applying that approach to the recent Section 5 cases would almost surely
have resulted in a different outcome in several of the cases. It is hard to argue
that the Patent Remedy Act (Florida Prepaid) did not at least "further the
objectives" of the due process guarantee (specifically, protection against
deprivation of patent rights); that the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(Kimel) did not at least "further the objectives" of the equal protection
guarantee (specifically, prohibition of irrational discrimination based on age);
387. Local No. 93, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 525
(1986) (quotations and alteration omitted).
388. Frew ex reL Frew v. Hawkins, 540 U.S. 431, 439-40 (2004). Frew does leave open
the possibility that the Young circle is smaller than the Firefighters circle for consent decrees
that govern State officials, but the Court does not indicate how that analysis would differ nor
have the lower courts thus far adopted such a view. See supra notes 155-58 and accompanying
text (explaining concentric circle model of Young doctrine's scope).
389. Caminker, supra note 232.
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or that Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act (Garrett) did not at least
"further the objectives" of the equal protection guarantee (specifically,
prohibition of irrational discrimination based on disability). And in all of those
cases, there was at least some legislative record or findings of abuse of the
relevant rights.
But this test is not a blank check to Congress. For example, the
Trademark Remedy Act (College Savings Bank) may not have passed muster
under the Frew approach. If neither of the asserted interests furthered by the
Trademark Remedy Act-a right to be free from a business competitor's false
advertising or a right to be secure in one's business interests--qualifies as a
constitutionally protected property interest, the Act cannot fairly be construed
as "furthering the objectives" of the due process guarantee. The civil remedy
provision of the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) (Morrison) presents a
tougher call. On the one hand, by protecting victims of gender-motivated
violence in light of biased State law enforcement and judicial systems, VAWA
could be said to "further the objectives" of the equal protection guarantee
(specifically, prohibition of illegitimate discrimination based on gender). On
the other hand, because VAWA applies to victims of private (as opposed to
State-sponsored) violence, one could reasonably argue that it does not
sufficiently "further the objectives" of equal protection, which only applies to
State discrimination. Even the Frew-based inquiry may thus leave some close
questions as to the validity of Section 5 legislation.
Of course, the ultimate result would not change in the Supreme Court's
two most recent pronouncements in the Section 5 area: Hibbs (Family Medical
Leave Act) and Lane (Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act). In both
of these cases, as discussed earlier, the Court actually upheld Section 5
legislation but adhered to its "congruence and proportionality" test. The Court
attempted to distinguish Hibbs based on the fact that gender-based claims get
heightened scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause. But it is difficult to
reconcile the result in Hibbs with that in Garrett based upon the "congruence
and proportionality" test. The legislative record in both cases contained
significant evidence of discrimination (gender and disability, respectively).
Notwithstanding heightened scrutiny for gender claims, it is quite unclear
whether the record of discrimination in Hibbs---once that record is limited to
State actors (the only relevant perpetrators according to Garrett) and the
specific context of sick leave as opposed to parental leave (in light of Garrett,
where the Court considered only employment as opposed to other sectors)-
contains any more concrete examples of constitutional violations than the
record in Garrett. As the number of violations seems to be the relevant
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quantity to justify Congress's exercise of Section 5, the differing results defy
clear explanation.
390
The Court resorted to a more novel tactic in Lane, considering Title II of
the ADA only as applied to the class of cases implicating the fundamental right
of access to the courts. As the dissent notes, one might read the majority's "as
applied" approach to Section 5 analysis as not only inconsistent with the
approach used in Florida Prepaid (where the Court did not limit application of
the statute to just intentional, uncompensated patent infringements), but as
essentially boiling down to "a test of whether the Court can conceive of a
hypothetical statute narrowly tailored enough to constitute valid prophylactic
legislation.
391
The confusion caused by the Court's questionable application in Hibbs
and its novel approach in Lane can easily be avoided. The Frew-based inquiry
provides a simpler, more coherent, and analytically cleaner way to achieve the
same results, as both the FMLA and Title II of the ADA clearly "further the
objectives" of the equal protection guarantee.
VI. Conclusion
This Article attempts to bring into sharper focus the unjustifiable nature of
the Supreme Court's recent Section 5 jurisprudence through the lens of consent
decrees against State entities, a species of a district court's remedial powers
pursuant to Ex parte Young. Given that the inconsistency in the Court's
treatment of these different modes of relief is patent as well as indefensible for
the reasons argued in this Article, one might ask what then explains the Court's
tolerance of that inconsistency. After all, the inconsistency-particularly in
permitting the enforcement of broad judicial decrees against States-
contradicts the conventional wisdom that the Rehnquist Court's paramount
objective has been the protection of States' rights. But the inconsistency
becomes much less surprising if one considers two other, more dominant trends
390. Vikram David Amar, The New "New Federalism": The Supreme Court in Hibbs (and
Guillen), 6 GREEN BAG 2d 349, 351-53 (2003) (characterizing as "perplexing" Court's analysis
in Hibbs).
391. Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 551 (2004) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
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that distinguish the Rehnquist Court: the limitation of congressional power
392
and the rise of judicial supremacy.393
The Court's "congruence and proportionality" framework has permitted it
to stake out an exclusive role in constitutional interpretation and to constrict the
scope of Congress's Section 5 authority in a manner not seen since
Reconstruction. This development fits well within the ambit of both larger
trends, reinforcing the Supreme Court's authority while diminishing
congressional power. At the same time, the Court appears willing to cede
remarkable discretion to federal district courts to bind State entities. That
development also tends to reflect the trend towards judicial supremacy--even
at the expense of State sovereignty-as federal district courts are judicial actors
that must ultimately follow the bidding of the Supreme Court.394 Moreover,
district courts construing and enforcing a statute pose far less a threat to the
Supreme Court's central role (at least from the Court's perspective) than
Congress construing and enforcing a substantive constitutional right. While
this explanation makes for a telling story of the Court's underlying motivations,
the Court's actions-whatever its motivations-have led to a particularly
inconsistent and unsound jurisprudence when it comes to the weighty problem
of redressing State violations of federal law.
392. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997) (striking down Brady
Handgun Violence Prevention Act based on the Tenth Amendment); United States v. Lopez,
514 U.S. 549,567 (1995) (striking down Gun-Free School Zones Act as exceeding Congress's
authority under the Commerce Clause); see also Neal Devins, Congress As Culprit: How
Lawmakers Spurred On The Court's Anti-Congress Crusade, 51 DUKE L.J. 435, 435 (2001)
(offering explanation for Court's perceived move to limit congressional authority).
393. See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, More Supreme Than Court? The Fall of the Political
Question Doctrine and the Rise of.Judicial Supremacy, 102 COLuM. L. REv. 237, 241 (2002)
("[M]y emphasis is on the Supreme Court's view in recent years that it alone among the three
branches has been allocated the power to provide the full substantive meaning of all
constitutional provisions."); Stephen G. Bragaw & Barbara A. Perry, The "Brooding
Omnipresence" in Bush v. Gore: Anthony Kennedy, The Equality Principle, and Judicial
Supremacy, 13 STAN. L. & POL'Y REv. 19, 21 (2002) ("The [Bush v. Gore] majority also
envisions a Court that brooks no coequal interpreter of the Constitution, a tribunal that is the
supreme arbiter of state and national conflict.").
394. It is worth noting that judicial supremacy arguments may ring a bit hollow when the
law that provides the baseline for the district court's remedial power is federal statutory law
rather than the Constitution. Although the Supreme Court has the final say as to the
Constitution's meaning, Congress has the final say on the content of the statute. From that
perspective, federal district court judges are in the same second-best position when they are
enforcing federal statutory law as Congress is when it is enforcing the Fourteenth Amendment.
Nevertheless, broad discretion in enforcing the underlying law ultimately helps aggrandize
judicial authority, irrespective of the baseline.
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